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Literally every dollar which is unnecessarily or uneconomically 
expended on administration is a dollar which could otherwise go 
to the plan participants. (Hoexter 1970, 134) 
The question may well be raised as to whether the administrative 
expenses are too low, with the result that the insured persons are 
not receiving adequate service. . . .  [Social security] beneficiaries 
deserve better service and could well be willing to bear the slight 
additional amount needed. (Myers 1992, 16) 
Looking across countries, government-managed old age social security sys- 
tems differ widely in the level of benefits they provide, their methods of  fi- 
nancing,  and their overall extent of redistributiveness.  Despite these differ- 
ences, a feature common to most of these old age income programs is that they 
are heading toward insolvency. As a result, there is increasing interest in and 
support for moving toward a mostly private retirement system, one that relies 
at least in part on investing retirement assets in private capital markets.' 
This paper addresses a possible concern arising from a move toward a privat- 
ized retirement system, namely, whether  administrative costs in a privately 
managed system would be expected to be higher or lower than those found in 
national, centrally run social security systems. The particular focus I take is 
that of the U.S. social security system, asking the following questions: What 
are the administrative costs of  the current U.S. retirement system? Does the 
United States spend too much on administering its old age social security sys- 
tem? What are the administrative costs of prominent alternatives to social secu- 
rity systems? Would a privately managed retirement system cost more or less 
than the current old age income system? 
I analyze available evidence on costs associated with  the U.S. and other 
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1.  In the United States, this topic was the subject of a Senate Finance Committee hearing (on 
25 March  1996) that reviewed options for privatization as described by  members of the Social 
Security Advisory Council as well as the chairs of the technical panels reporting to the council 
(see also Quinn and Mitchell 1996). 
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national social security systems and compare them to expenses reported by 
various other institutions that might be seen as alternative  means to supply 
retirement protection. 
To preview the conclusions, I find that administrative costs of publicly run 
social security systems vary greatly across countries and institutional settings. 
Some are less expensive to manage than others, and it is clear that scale mat- 
ters: larger publicly managed old age programs cost less than do smaller public 
plans. It is also clear that quality varies across programs: some public systems 
have low expenses but deliver few and/or poor-quality services. While public- 
system administrative costs could in some cases be reduced, cutting expenses 
cannot save an insolvent plan, and cost pressure could lessen service quality. I 
also examine the possibility of replacing a publicly managed retirement system 
with privately managed alternatives in the United States and conclude that a 
privately managed old age retirement saving program would probably be more 
costly than the current publicly managed social security program. Neverthe- 
less, a privately managed system is likely to offer better and more diverse ser- 
vices in exchange for these higher costs, including the opportunity to self- 
direct pension asset investments, the possibility  of  investing in higher-return 
assets, the likelihood of more frequent reporting to participants, and possibly 
greater satisfaction with the system as a whole. 
10.1  An Overview of Government-Run Social Security System 
Administrative Costs 
It is useful to begin by recalling the objectives of a national social security 
system before hoping to understand whether the costs associated with manag- 
ing one can be altered or reduced. Looking across countries, it is clear that 
two (at times competing) objectives are common to most countries’ programs: 
providing earnings replacement for retirees and providing welfare support for 
the elderly indigent. In this section, I first review available data on publicly run, 
government-managed social security systems from developed and developing 
countries; I then turn to a more detailed look at the U.S.  old age retirement 
income system.* Finally, I offer an evaluation of the factors that influence so- 
cial security administration costs in a multivariate framework. 
10.1.1 
Social security systems around the world approach the twin goals of welfare 
and earnings insurance in numerous ways and with weights that differ across 
countries. For instance, in the United States, the social security program con- 
centrates mainly on old age, survivor, and disability benefits, while, in Europe, 
International Perspectives on Social Security Costs 
2.  This section draws on Reid and Mitchell (1995) and Sunden and Mitchell (1994). It should 
be emphasized that the present paper focuses on the provision of retirement income, not health 
care and welfare/social assistance. Also, disability benefits are treated only in passing. 405  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
medical and unemployment insurance programs are also included under the 
social security ~mbrella.~  The form of  the benefit varies a great deal across 
countries, too; some follow a defined-benefit formula, wherein the benefit pay- 
ment is linked to years of service and earned income, while others follow a 
defined-contribution approach, tying payments to assets accumulated in an in- 
vestment account. 
Because my focus is on the expenses associated with running a retirement 
system, it is useful to define social security administrative expenses as the costs 
of providing these retirement benefits. That is, I focus. not on the tax and/or 
investment revenue used to pay benefits, but rather on the expenses incurred in 
collecting the funds, managing the records, investing the money, determining 
eligibility, and paying out benefits. 
An economic measure of this concept would include the full resource costs 
of producing these services, which is not necessarily the charges that govem- 
ment agencies report. A discrepancy  sometimes occurs because government 
services are often not  valued at their economic resource  cost-particularly 
when public agencies do not purchase their inputs in a competitive market. 
As an example, many government-managed social security systems use pub- 
lic buildings and land. Reported social security administration costs under such 
a system will not reflect economic scarcity values. Nor will reported public- 
sector provision costs be an accurate estimate of the likely costs that private- 
sector counterparts would charge in performing the same services. Similarly, 
government contracts to install computer systems are awarded on a noncom- 
petitive basis in many countries, and, in other cases, the public pension agency 
may obtain its mail and telephone services at a subsidized rate. Depreciation 
and fringe benefits often do not appear on a government agency’s budget, and 
costs of  collecting the payroll tax are often shouldered by the central tax au- 
thority. 
For all these reasons, publicly managed old age programs would be expected 
to appear less expensive than they actually are, relative to privately managed 
plans. Conversely, when services are contracted through private firms, adminis- 
trative costs will probably appear higher than in public plans because market 
prices for inputs will have to be paid. The resulting public/private cost differen- 
tial may therefore be more apparent than red4 
Keeping these caveats in mind, I next review reported social security admin- 
istration costs from almost fifty developed and developing countries around 
the world.5 Table 10.1 reveals that OECD countries spent an order of magni- 
3. A discussion of the rationale for retirement systems is offered by Atkinson (1987, 1989) and 
Barn (1992), among others. 
4. Private pension plans must also recognize a premium to cover the longevity, inflation, and 
interest rate risks they assume, whereas most government-run retirement systems will instead im- 
plicitly bear the costs and raise taxes if the need arises (see Mitchell and Sunden 1993; Mitchell, 
Sunden, and Hsin 1994; Reid and Mitchell 1995). 
5. Where possible, only old age retirement programs were included in table  10.1, but social 
security costs were not always broken down by type in developing countries. 406  Olivia S. Mitchell 
Table 10.1  Administrative Costs as a Percentage of Social Security 
Benefit Expenditures 











































































































Source: Mitchell, Sunden, Hsin, and Reid (1994). 
Note; Data may reflect expenditures on pensions in all cases; in some, additional functions as the 
provision of  health services are included. 
tude less on social security costs at the end of the 1980s-3  percent of their 
annual system budgets-as  compared to the developing nations of  the Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) region, where administrative costs ran 28 per- 
cent of annual expenditures. 
One of the least costly programs on the list in table 10.1 is the U.S. old age 
program, whose reported administration costs in 1990 stood at less than 1 per- 
cent (0.7 percent) of old age benefit expenditures, after falling by a third during 
the 1980s.  By contrast, the LAC countries with the lowest reported administra- 
tion costs as a fraction of benefit expenditures included Argentina, with re- 
ported administration costs for its public plan at 2.3 percent of benefit expendi- 
tures,  Costa  Rica,  with  4.8  percent  of  benefit  expenditures  devoted  to 
administration costs under the old age and disability insurance, and Chile, with 407  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
an 8 percent  expense rate  for its public plan  overall (Sunden and Mitchell 
1993). 
Part of the explanation for the marked differences in social security adminis- 
trative costs across countries is that program objectives vary internationally, in 
terms of the particular mix of social assistance (benefits tied to need) and insur- 
ance (benefit tied to contributions), the degree to which the programs are gov- 
ernment run or privately managed, and even the types of payments  offered, 
including cash and in-lund transfers to the elderly, survivors, the disabled, the 
sick, new mothers, the unemployed, and so forth. For example, in both Argen- 
tina and Chile, the range of government programs is wide and includes old age, 
survivor, and disability benefits, cash sickness and maternity benefits, medical 
care and work injury coverage, an unemployment insurance system, and a fam- 
ily allowance plan. In Costa Rica, by contrast, unemployment and family al- 
lowance plans are not included in the social security system design. For this 
reason, cross-national data on administrative costs are somewhat treacherous 
to interpret.6 
A related issue is how one should handle measurement problems that arise 
when assessing social security costs. Ideally, the administration costs would be 
normalized by a direct measure of the service being provided-namely,  social 
security administration. Unfortunately, there is no simple measure of this mul- 
tidimensional service. Normalizing by total benefit expenditures, as in table 
10.1, tends to make costs look lower in more generous systems as well as in 
mature systems with more beneficiaries  than  contributors. Conversely, costs 
appear lower in systems paying high benefit levels when one normalizes pro- 
gram  expenditures  by  beneficiaries.  Normalizing  by  assets  is  meaningless 
when the publicly managed plan has few assets (as in pay-as-you-go systems), 
although this is the statistic of choice often given by private pension plans and 
mutual funds. Normalizing program expenditures by per capita income tends 
to make richer countries with more generous programs look more cost effec- 
tive. Clearly, there is no perfect or universally accepted normalization method 
to use in reporting retirement system costs. 
At least one useful approximation to a measure of social security administra- 
tion services is thenumber of clients a system serves. In other words, one could 
sum contributors and beneficiaries,  ideally appropriately weighted to reflect 
the relative contribution of each client type to the administrative service de- 
mands  placed  on the  social  security  agency.  Lacking  a  simple,  defensible 
method of assigning weights to client types, the common practice is simply to 
assign equal weights. 
The effect of using different cost measures across social security administer- 
ing agencies is not trivial. Table 10.2 offers data on administrative retirement 
6. I do not investigate here whether a social security program is consistent with national goals 
of  growth and income distribution,  although some systems are probably more conducive than 
others to these objectives (see World Bank 1994). Table 10.2  Annual Social Security Administrative Costs per Financial Flow Measures (%) 
Argentina: ANSeS, Costs per  United States: SSA, Cost 
Chile  Benefit  per Benefit 
AFP, Admin.  INP, Admin.  Costa Rica: CCSS,  Without  With 
Charges per  Costs per  Admin. Costs per  Collection  Collection 








1987  25 
1988  24 
1989  20 
1990  18 
1991 







.9  2.8 
1.1  2.0 
1.7 
1.8 
2.7  5.3 
2.2  4.1 
2.3  5.5 
3.3  5.6  .7  2.4 
2.7  5.1  .7  2.4 
4.7  7.4 
Source: Reid and Mitchell (1995). 
Note: Data in this table reflect only pension-related social security functions. 409  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
system costs in Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, and the United States normalized 
by financial flows (either contribution or benefit payments). Data on four pub- 
lic plans were developed by Reid and Mitchell (1995), namely, Chile’s public- 
sector INP (Instituto de Normalizacion Previsional) system, Costa Rica’s pub- 
lic  CCSS  (Caja  Costarricense  de  Seguridad  Social)  system,  Argentina’s 
publicly run (Administracion Nacional de la Seguridad Social) ANSeS system, 
and the U.S. OASI (old age and survivors insurance) system. Across these four 
public systems, administrative costs range from about 1 to 7 percent of benefit 
payments, with the lowest being for the U.S. OASI program.’ In addition, data 
are provided on Chile’s private-sector pension  agencies, known as the AFP 
funds. These have been criticized as having high administrative costs, and cer- 
tainly table 10.2 indicates that they are the most costly of those shown, with 
1993 administration costs equaling  17 percent of  contributions. However, it 
should be noted that these AFP costs have fallen steadily from a high of 25-30 
percent of contributions at the system’s inception in the early 1980s.* 
To show how different normalization methods change perceptions of system 
expenses, table 10.3 offers other variants. During the early 1990s, for example, 
expenses under Chile’s privately managed AFP program were roughly equiva- 
lent to those incurred by that country’s public social security system (INP) on 
an active contributor basis-around  U.S.$50.00 per year. The figures would be 
even lower if one used total rather than active contributors since there are many 
inactive accounts under the Chilean AFP system. On a total contributor basis, 
the administrative costs of  Chile’s privately managed pension  plan stood at 
between U.S.$23.00 and U.S.$45.00, only two-thirds the level of Chile’s public 
INP per member costs (1992 US.   dollar^).^ Clearly, privately managed retire- 
ment systems are not necessarily more expensive than their public-sector coun- 
terparts. 
Another  interesting  finding from table  10.3 concerns the  wide  range  of 
public-system costs. At the low end of the range are U.S. retirement  system 
costs at $12.00-$14.00  per covered worker per year and the Costa Rican sys- 
tem’s reported expenses of  less than  $lO.OO.lo  At the upper end among the 
7. In the case of Argentina, there was some question as to the proper cost to assess for payroll 
tax collections. The data given assume that average tax collection costs should be charged to the 
public pension system for the collection of social security taxes; while this is probably too high a 
charge, no other figures are available (see Reid and Mitchell 1995). 
8. High administrative expenses  have  also been  experienced  under Argentina’s  new  private 
defined-contribution system modeled after the Chilean regime; here, administrative charges cur- 
rently amount to 32 percent of contributions (personal communication, Rafael Rofman,  1996). 
However, the Argentine private pension system is only in its second year of operation, and charges 
would be expected to decline over time. 
9. It should also be noted that there are important differences in services rendered across sys- 
tems in Chile; most private pension (Am)  members are not retired, while most public plan (INP) 
participants are. 
10.  It should also be evident that system cost comparisons are sensitive to the measure of parti- 
cipants used, For  instance, normalizing by  beneficiaries yields U.S.  system cost estimates more 
than three and a half times higher than those generated by normalizing with contributors. Table 10.3  Administrative Costs per Participant Measures (constant 1992 US.  dollars) 
Year 
Argentina: ANSeS, Cost per 
Member  Chile 
AFP 
Without  With 
Per Active  Per  INP, per Plan  Costa Rica: CCSS,  Collection  Collection 
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Source; Reid and Mitchell (1995). 
Note: For similar data on forty-two countries worldwide, including some of the above, see World Bank (1994, table A.9) 412  Olivia S. Mitchell 
cases studied is the Argentine public system, where annual per member costs 
total  about $70.00 (1992 U.S. dollars)."  In any event, the Chilean public as 
well as private system figures appear to be about mid-range in absolute dollars 
and certainly not outliers in terms of available data.'* 
Some lessons may be drawn from the discussion thus far. First, data prob- 
lems limit comparisons that can be made across systems, and no cost normal- 
ization is ideal for all purposes. When comparing costs across countries, it is 
likely that normalization by the number of participants comes closest to captur- 
ing trends in the levels of administrative expenses, although it cannot account 
for differences in the services provided-a  flaw shared by all the typical nor- 
malization procedures. Second, it would be useful to have service-specific cost 
accounting, identifying the specific functions performed by a social security 
system as well as the costs incurred in undertaking them. 
10.1.2  A Closer Look at U.S. Social Security System Functions and 
Administrative Expenses 
The U.S. social security system is a large and complex institution. Its four 
main  programs  include the old age (OA) retirement program, the disability 
insurance (DI) program, the hospital insurance (HI) program, and the supple- 
mental  medical  insurance  (SMI)  program  (Social  Security  Administration 
1995). Most proposals to privatize the retirement portion of the social security 
system have focused almost exclusively on the OASI program; hence, the dis- 
cussion here  will be  mainly  concerned with the costs of  administering that 
program. In contrast, the Medicare and disability components will not concern 
us further except when data limitations require it. 
Turning to table 10.4, it is useful to gain a working familiarity with the size 
and scope of what is generally known as the retirement component of the social 
security system in the United States. The OASDI program is a mandatory, vir- 
tually universal program, collecting tax revenues in 1994 from some 139 mil- 
lion workers annually, and paying benefits to 37 million retired plus 6 million 
disabled persons each year. OASDI system revenues in 1994 totaled $380 bil- 
lion, or about 12 percent of covered earnings ($2,700 in contributions and in- 
terest per covered worker per year in  1994). OASDI system benefits came to 
$317  billion  in  1994,  paying  an  annual  retired-worker  benefit  averaging 
$8,400-approximately  35 percent of covered payroll-and  a disabled-worker 
benefit of  about $7,900. Because the nation's social security system is mostly 
11. This high figure assumes that average rather than marginal tax collection costs should be 
assessed against the public plan. While this is no doubt unrealistic, more precise data do not exist. 
12. Salvador Valdts-Prieto  notes that thc figures for Chile are not exactly comparable with 
those reported in other countries since Chile's system exacts a one-time fee when  the defined- 
contribution monies are contributed and no additional fees are charged on the accruing assets 
(personal communication, 1996).  Larry Kotlikoff argues that it is more appropriate to spread the 
Chilean one-time up-front fee over the pension accrual phase in order to determine its effect on 
annualiz.ed returns, which he estimates at approximately eighty basis points per year for younger 
contributors (personal communication, 1996). Table 10.4  Facts and Figures about OASDI (1994 dollars) 
Quantity  Source 
Revenues and tax base: 
OASI revenues ($million) 
DI revenues ($million) 
Workers with taxable earnings (million) 
Workers fully insured (million) 
Covered earnings ($million) 
Average earnings/covered worker ($) 
OASI revenueskovered worker ($) 
OASI revenueskovered earnings (%) 
OASDI revenueskovered worker ($1 
OASDI revenueskovered earnings (%) 
OASI benefits paid ($million) 
DI benefits paid ($million) 
OASI recipients (million) 
DI recipients (million) 
Average annual retired worker 
Average retired worker benefit/average 
Average disabled worker benefit ($) 
Covered workers + OASDI recipients 
Beneficiaries and benefits: 
benefit ($) 
covered earnings (%) 
(million) 
Trust fund accumulation: 
OASI fund year end 1994 ($million) 
DI fund year end 1994 ($million) 
OASI fundhevenues (%) 
OASDI fundrevenues (%) 
OASDI funds/participants ($) 
Annual OASDI administrative costs: 
Administrative costs ($million) 
Administrative costskovered worker ($) 
Administrative costs/participant ($) 
Administrative costshenefits paid (%) 
Administrative costdtrust fund (%) 
Administrative costs/contributors (%) 
Annual OASI administrative costs: 
Administrative costs ($million) 
Administrative costs/covered worker ($) 
Administrative costs/participant ($) 
Administrative costs/benefits paid (%) 
Administrative costshrust fund (%) 
Administrative costskontributors (%) 
Administrative data (all OASDHI 
included in counts): 
No. of SSA employees 
(continued) 




































SSA 1995, table 4.AI 
SSA 1995, table 4.A2 
SSA 1995, table 4.B1 
SSA 1995, table 4.C1 






SSA 1995, table 4.A4 
SSA 1995, table 4.A4 
SSA 1995, table 5.A4 
SSA 1995, table 5.A4 
SSA 1995. table 3.C4 
Author’s calculations 
SSA 1995, table 5.A1 
Author’s calculations 
SSA 1995, table 4.A1 
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Author’s calculations; 





SSA 1995, 14 
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Author’s calculations; 
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Table 10.4  (continued) 
Quantity  Source 
No. of SSA offices: 
Field and regional offices 
Appealshearings offices 
Service centers 
Data operations center 
Claims information: 
Processed claims/year (thousands) 
Accuracy rates, OASI (%) 
1,412  SSA 1995, table 2.FI 
146  SSA 1995, table 2.Fl 
6  SSA 1995, table 2.F1 
1  SSA 1995, table 2.F1 
3,206  SSA 1995, table 2.F4 
99.80  SSA 1995, table 2.F7 
a pay-as-you-go account, the difference between system revenues and annual 
outlays is quite narrow. The excess revenue has been deposited into so-called 
trust funds projected to grow and then be depleted as the baby boom cohort 
ages. In 1994, the OASI trust fund amounted to only about 125 percent of one 
year’s annual outlays, or $2,270 on a per participant basis. Thus, the OASI trust 
fund could not guarantee a robust flow of retirement income if it were to be 
allocated among participants covered by  the system today, contrary to some 
popular opinion. 
In approaching the question of  how expensive the current social security 
system is to administer, table 10.4 shows that costs totaled $1.6 billion in 1994. 
This may be broken down to an annual $12.00 per covered worker (or $9.00 
per participant, including retirees). As a fraction of benefits paid, these admin- 
istrative costs equaled 0.6 percent of benefits paid, or 0.4 percent of contribu- 
tions.  Computed  administrative costs as a fraction  of  system assets  would 
amount to 0.39 percent, or thirty-nine basis points; although this computation 
is the usual one reported for mutual funds, it is meaningless to report figures 
this way since the system is mostly unfunded.13 
One fact to point out regarding social security administrative costs is that 
they have apparently fallen over time quite substantially. This pattern is ex- 
plained partly by the fact that, as a system grows, fixed costs can be spread 
over larger participant pools and partly by  the fact that benefit payouts and 
retiree numbers rose over time. Robert Myers (1992) traces the time path of 
administrative expenses since the social security program’s inception, conclud- 
ing that costs in the early days of the program were over ten times greater than 
they are now. His analysis used total OASDHI costs, which during the period 
1940-44  amounted to 22 percent of  benefits; at the beginning of the  1990s, 
these total costs stood at just 1 percent of benefits paid (Myers 1992, 16).  This 
13. For the combined OASDI program, total administration costs amounted to $2,600 million 
in  1994, or $19.00 per worker (and $14.00 per participant). As a percentage of  benefits paid, 
administrative costs for this segment of  social security came to 0.93 percent of benefits, or 0.68 
percent of contributions, and 0.63 percent, or sixty-three basis points, of the combined OASDI 
trust funds. 415  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
trend conceals cross-program differences, however (table 10.5). Costs for the 
old age and survivors program were halved between  1980 and 1994, falling 
from 1.07 percent of benefits paid to 0.59 percent. In contrast, administrative 
expenses for the DI program rose substantially over the same period, from 2 
to 2.7 percent of benefits. It seems fair to conclude that the retirement compo- 
nent of  the social security system has become more cost effective over the 
period but that the disability program has 
A different approach to measuring costs under the U.S. retirement system is 
to assess the ways in which the system allocates its administrative  expenditures 
(Mitchell and Sunden 1993). It is probably not  surprising to learn that the 
OASI system devotes the lion’s share-93  percent-of  its administration ex- 
penses to the benefit function. This benefit function entails the determination 
of eligibility for prospective retirees, spouses, and survivor recipients, along 
with the actual payment of benefits. Because most of the payroll tax revenue 
is collected by  the Internal Revenue Service, a relatively small amount-on 
the order of 7 percent of administrative expenses-is  devoted to revenue col- 
lection. In this sense, the social security system benefits from substantial exter- 
nalities by piggybacking on the IRS collection mechanisms and enforcement 
structure. Finally, a tiny fraction of expenses-less  than one one-hundredth of 
a percent-is  currently allocated to the money-management function. This is 
because the social security system’s trust funds are by  law required to be in- 
vested in special issue Treasury bills. Clearly, under current regulations, there 
is no need for a large financial management staff, and the system’s costs are 
held down because of this condition. 
10.2  Determinants of Social Security Retirement System 
Administrative Expenses 
10.2.1  Measuring Inputs and Outputs 
The question of whether social security expenses are at the “right” level (or 
too high, or too low) is a difficult one to address since often a nation’s social 
security system is run as a government monopoly producing outputs that are 
not competitively priced. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether levels 
of output produced, costs incurred, and services generated by the government 
agency are comparable to or differ from what one might anticipate if the sys- 
tem were operated by the private sector. 
As an example, the U.S. social security retirement program currently pro- 
vides benefits that are in part earnings insurance and in part redistributive wel- 
fare payments. It is debatable whether a private market could, and would, sub- 
stitute for  a  mandatory  system with  an  equally  strong redistributive bent, 
14. The fact that disability claims require the collection of medical data and subsequent medical 
assessments probably helps explain why the process is more cumbersome. 416  Olivia S. Mitchell 
Table 10.5  U.S. Social Security Administration Costs over Time (per capita, 
1994 dollars) 
Administrative Cost  Administrative Cost per 





















































Sources:  1980-90  figures from Mitchell and Sunden (1993). 1994 data from SSA (1995, tables 
4A1 and 2,4B  1, 5A4, 8B I  and 2). 
particularly if participation were voluntary (Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). If one 
thought that private producers could replicate the social insurance program, 
then private-sector costs could be used to compare with government costs, in 
order to assess whether the government  program was paying  an appropriate 
level of  administrative expenses. On the other hand, if no private group could 
replicate the government program, it might be impossible to ascertain whether 
current levels of administrative costs are equal to those that would prevail in a 
competitive market. 
In addition, of course, social security system expenses should properly be 
assessed in the context of a model that specifies production inputs, constraints, 
and the available technology with which these can be combined to produce 
desired outputs. In practice, it is difficult to develop such a model using real- 
world data since the system produces many outputs using a range of inputs, all 
of which are difficult to measure empirically. 
To illustrate this point, it is helpful to turn to some aggregate output data on 
the  U.S.  retirement  system. Annually,  some  43  million  recipients  receive 
OASDI benefit checks, and about 4.8 million new cases are filed (Social Secu- 
rity Administration 1995, table 2.F). The Social Security Administration (SSA) 417  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
also collects contributions for 139 million workers and tracks the earnings re- 
cords of more than 200 million people over time. 
These aggregate performance measures aside, it is far more difficult to de- 
termine whether the system is providing optimal levels of service for the costs 
incurred. In particular, the retirement-system portion of  the SSA has several 
different  responsibilities,  including  issuing all workers  (and, most recently, 
children) social security numbers, maintaining earnings records, and determin- 
ing eligibility and paying benefits in a timely manner. The agency has set itself 
internal standards, which it has been meeting to a greater or lesser degree. For 
example, as table 10.6 notes, 98 percent of applicants filing for social security 
numbers receive them within twenty-four hours and obtain their cards within 
five days; there appears to be little error in this process. This is a massive task, 
inasmuch as the SSA issued  17 million new numbers per year in the early 
1990s (personal interviews with SSA staff). (That the system has upgraded 
service from the early  1980s is evident from the fact that, a decade ago, ob- 
taining a social security number took six weeks [Sunden and Mitchell 19941.) 
Nevertheless, the system seems to be slow in tracking earnings and contribu- 
tions. Under current law, employers furnish reports of  wage earnings to the 
SSA (the self-employed report pay  via their income tax reports). Annually, 
something on the order of 227 million earnings reports are received. Of late, 
there has been some delay in the recording of earnings within the agency’s own 
recommended time line; for example, only 70 percent of earnings were posted 
within six months of the tax-year end in 1991 (although accuracy rates were 
99.2 percent [as per Mitchell and Sunden 19931). This performance is within 
the agency’s standards and is certainly  a vast improvement since the early 
1980s, when updating of earnings records took two to three years (Doggette 
1988). Nevertheless,  it  might  be  suspected that  delays in posting earnings 
would be quite problematic if the system were to move toward an individual 
account-type  program. Indeed, when lags of ninety days were recently  de- 
tected for privately sponsored 401(k) accounts, the U.S. Department of Labor 
deemed this period unusually and unacceptably long (Limbacher 1995). 
Since benefit payments are the major activity of the  SSA, it is here that 
performance data are most critical. One performance statistic (see table 10.6) 
indicates that about 95 percent of all initial benefit payments are correctly de- 
termined each year. Overall, around 7 million new claims are registered per 
year (counting all OASDHI applicants), and meeting this workload is a sub- 
stantial task. A different way the SSA judges its performance is by  its new 
claims accuracy rate, which in 1993 stood at 99.8 percent for OA benefits and 
94.2 percent for DI benefits (Social Security Administration 1995, table 2.F7). 
A further performance standard is the computed “accuracy of lifetime benefits 
per award,” which has been reported at close to  100 percent for some time. 
Finally, the agency monitors whether benefits are received on time. On average, 
it takes seventeen days from the time a retiree files for benefits for the first Table 10.6  U.S. Retirement System Performance Standards and Quality Measures 
Service Provided  Output Measure  Standard  Quality of Service 
Pay benefits correctly  Benefit expenditures 
Pay benefits on time 
Issue social security numbers  Approximately 7-8  million  Assign social security number within 
issued per year  24 hours of  receiving 
documentation 
correctly 
under 30 days 
Issue social security number 
Correct social security problems in 
100% accuracy goal, initial payment 
100% accuracy goal, lifetime 
Accurate DI determinations 
First benefit check within  IS days of 
filing for old age benefits 
Regular old age benefits paid on 
schedule 
DI benefits paid within 6 months of 
disability or 60 days of  filing 
Denied claims noticed within 60 
days, 120 days for hearings, 90 
days for review of  appeal 
payment 
9X%  get social security number in 24 
hours, cards within 5 days 
99.8% of social security numbers 
Not measured 
correct 
94.8% of initial payments correct 
99.8% of lifetime dollars correct 
96.7% DI accuracy rate 
17 days average payment time 
99.94 of regular payments on 
schedule 
90 days average to process disability 
cases 
229 days average to process hearing, 
239 for appeals case; 13.2% of 
hearings with decision within  120 
days of filing Personal contact  Number of telephone calls. 
letters, visitors 
15 minutes or less waiting time in 
field office with appointment, 30 
minutes without 
Accurate handling of phone calls 
within 24 hours 
Maintain accurate earnings  Number of contributors, amount  Post earnings accurately 
records  of contributions 
Earnings posted within 6 months of 
Resolve earnings differences within 
end of tax year 
30 days 
Source: Adapted from Sunden and Mitchell (1994) 
87.5% with appointment seen in  15 
minutes or less, or else 82.3% 
seen in 30 minutes or less; 4.7% 
without appointment seen in 30 
minutes or less 
92.9% of  callers can access 800 
number in 24 hours or less: 12.5 
days for handling inquiries 
99.2% of  reported earnings posted 
70% of  reported earnings posted 
Not presently measured 
accurately 
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payment to be received, a figure slightly higher than the performance target of 
fifteen days. The agency also reports that it makes 99.9 percent of retirement 
benefit payments on the scheduled delivery dates, a statistic that is certainly 
consistent with reliable service. 
In providing these services, the agency is aware of and seeks to reduce sys- 
tem fraud. As in all programs, some level of investigation is required to deter- 
mine whether new applicants are in fact eligible for benefits and whether cur- 
rent  beneficiaries  should continue to receive payments.  Common  forms of 
deception include failure to notify the agency when recipients change eligibil- 
ity status (owing to marriage or death, e.g.); also, some participants have more 
than one social security number, potentially enabling them to receive multiple 
benefit checks. As the SSA has upgraded its computer files and systems in the 
last decade, more careful and extensive cross-checks have become feasible. In 
addition, in recent years, the SSA has required beneficiaries to recertify their 
eligibility periodically  and actively pursues allegations of fraud through the 
office of the inspector general (Sunden and Mitchell 1994). 
Whether the optimal level of output (including service and fraud control) is 
being expended by the SSA is difficult to determine given available data. What 
we do know is that the agency has faced substantial cutbacks in its workforce 
over the last decade, now employing some 64,000 full-time employees, or 0.37 
employees per  1,000 active participants,  down from 0.68 workers per 1,000 
insured in 1980 (table 10.4 above; and Sunden and Mitchell 1994). Downsiz- 
ing was made possible by  the introduction of  a new computer system that 
helped reduce reported administrative costs by  about one-third over the last 
couple of decades (Doggette 1988). Computerization also permitted better cost 
accounting for each separate agency function, including tracking of personnel 
salary  and  benefits  (accounting  for  approximately  60 percent  of  SSA ex- 
penses). One potentially troublesome area identified by  the U.S. General Ac- 
counting Office is the fact that it is not always possible to detect poorly per- 
forming SSA employees; hence, federal government employees’ tenure is not 
readily rescinded in such cases (US. General Accounting Office 1989). 
How do U.S. system performance levels compare to those of other nations?15 
With regard to collecting tax contributions, for instance, the Chilean private 
system reports an error rate of 0.8-1  percent in posting contributions to indi- 
vidual accounts, similar to the U.S. SSA’s error rate of 0.8 percent in posting 
contributors’ summary earnings records.  l6 The Chilean private pension system 
appears to do better updating accounts, reporting only 6 percent delayed ac- 
counts within a one-month window (in the United States, there is a 30 percent 
incidence of nonupdated accounts within six months of the close of a tax year). 
15. The data in this and the next two paragraphs are taken from Reid and Mitchell (1995). 
16. As might be expected, many developing countries’ national social security systems do not 
regularly provide data on the accuracy and timeliness of  tax and benefit functions. This was true, 
e.g., in a recent analysis of  the Costa Rican national retirement system (the CCSS), the Argentine 
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Another issue is system evasion, an increasingly serious problem around the 
world. Argentina reports that as many as half of all eligible contributors do not 
pay into the system, and, in Uruguay, the figure is estimated at 44 percent (Reid 
and  Mitchell  1995). Having  a computerized database of  covered earnings 
greatly facilitates this supervisory task, as in the United States and many other 
developed nations. It is likely that a system will be more efficient when the 
revenue  collection  and  record-keeping  functions  are  handled  by  a  single 
agency, and, thus, when Mexico developed its new individual account retire- 
ment system, it opted for centralized computer technology to track taxes paid 
and benefits delivered. 
Performance can also be compared with regard to the effectiveness of deliv- 
ering retiree benefits. This complex of tasks is handled rather inexpensively by 
the U.S. social security system since initial payments are in error only 5 per- 
cent of the time and a mere seventeen days are required to process an old age 
pension claim (it takes ninety days to process a disability claim). In contrast, 
the Chilean privatized pension system reports a 27 percent error rate in benefit 
determinations, and processing of normal retirement pension determinations 
requires seventeen days, that of early retirement and survival pensions sixty- 
five and seventy-four days, respectively, and disability pensions 146 days. Pub- 
lic plans in other countries fare poorly on this criterion as well: in Costa Rica, 
20-50  percent of old age pension determinations are appealed annually, after 
60-150  days to process an old age pension  and  150-80  days to process an 
invalidity pension. The public pension system in Argentina, ANSeS, requires 
60-150  days to process pension  claims, and almost one-third  of  all benefit 
determinations are appealed. One positive finding is that the Chilean public 
pension  (INP) system was successful in its effort to halve its determination 
times between 1990 and 1993, as a result of concerted effort on the part of the 
government and international lending agencies. In general, both privately and 
publicly run retirement systems could improve service quality to program ben- 
eficiaries (Reid and Mitchell 1995). 
A third function that both public and private retirement systems bear respon- 
sibility for is the management  of contributed funds. It seems reasonable  to 
expect that assets held in a partially (or fully) funded system should be invested 
prudently, following  accepted  money  management (and possibly  fiduciary) 
practices. By law in the United States, social security trust fund investment 
practices are sharply constrained, but, in other countries, more flexibility is 
evident, and performance has been widely variable. Overall, it appears that 
private pension system managers subject to competitive market pressures often 
tend to generate higher real rates of return on average than do publicly man- 
aged funds. For example, the Chilean private defined-contribution system re- 
ported returns of  13 and 9.2 percent over the periods 1980-85  and 1985-90, 
respectively (Valdis-Prieto 1994); this exceeded returns of 7.7 and 9.6 percent 
achieved by the U.S. SSA fund over the same periods as well as the 7.8 percent 
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earned by public funds in eight industrial c0untries.l’ Even worse, Costa Rica’s 
and Peru’s public pension funds reported negative real rates of return over the 
decade of the 1980s-as  have large numbers of other public pension systems 
around the world (World Bank 1994). 
To  sum up thus  far, assessing the  efficiency  of  the U.S. government-run 
social security  system is problematic because it is a government  monopoly, 
providing services for which there are no precise private market counterparts. 
In any event, administrative expenses for the U.S. Social Security Administra- 
tion’s old age retirement program are moderate in terms of international com- 
parisons and also have declined over time. U.S. annual retirement system ad- 
ministration  costs currently run  under $15.00 per  worker;  these equal 0.42 
percent of contributions, or 0.57 percent of benefits paid. As a percentage of 
system assets, costs sum to 0.39 percent, or thirty-nine basis points; this figure 
is not directly comparable with privately managed plans, however, since the 
system is only very partially funded. Also, inasmuch as social security taxes 
are collected by the IRS and the SSA trust funds are invested in treasuries, the 
majority of administrative costs can be attributed to the benefit function. 
Although it is debatable whether the system spends “enough’ or “too much” 
on administrative expenses, it seems clear that determination of eligibility for 
old age benefits is handled with alacrity and that payments are made on time. 
These costs have trended down in part because fixed costs are now amortized 
over a larger participant pool and also because of computerization and the sub- 
sequent downsizing of the agency. The fact that workers’ earnings take a while 
to be posted to their social security earnings file does not materially influence 
the system as it is structured now; however, such a delay would certainly be 
more troublesome in an individual account system. The DI system appears to 
be experiencing relatively more administrative difficulties; costs including DI 
are under $20.00 per worker, 0.68 percent of  contributions, 0.93 percent of 
benefits, and 0.63 percent of the combined OASDI trust funds. 
10.2.2  Multivariate Models of Social Security Costs 
A more systematic assessment of  social security costs is facilitated with a 
multivariate model linking production costs to output. While a cost function 
methodology is most familiar to those examining firms operating in a competi- 
tive market  framework, it has also been  applied to the study of  government 
units in order to determine whether scale economies exist in the production of 
government services and to ascertain which technological factors most influ- 
ence measured costs.1* 
17.  Some would argue that the Chilean market’s return should not be compared to those of 
developed countries since the Chilean AFPs were initially restricted to holding mainly government 
paper and still are very heavily concentrated in Chilean firms. Hence, their investment universe 
had very different riskheturn characteristics than U.S. or European markets. 
18. For examples of this literature, see Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider (1982) and 
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In the context of the social security question, analysts have used a general 
cost model relating system administrative costs to output levels, input prices, 
and indicators of program characteristics and technology, as follows: 
f(output, input prices, program characteristics, technology). 
(1) 
The idea is that social security costs, usually measured as reported administra- 
tive expenses somehow normalized, should be influenced by  output (proxied 
by benefit measures such as system expenditures), holding constant other fac- 
tors. Depending on the country and system under study, one would want to 
control such other factors as input prices (for labor, land, and capital) and pro- 
gram characteristics varying by locale (including, e.g., whether the program is 
means tested, whether it is centrally run or decentralized, and other related 
aspects of the program itself). Additionally, when one looks across systems and 
countries, it is clearly important to try to control for differences in technology, 
including the degree to which computerization has been achieved by the sys- 
tem, the degree to which the system relies on a modern communications and 
banking infrastructure, and the overall literacy (and perhaps financial literacy) 
rate in the population. Finally, as Valdks-Prieto (1993, 1994) has pointed out 
in a case-study analysis of Chile, the United States, Malaysia, and Zambia, it is 
important, but extremely difficult, to control for quality differences in services 
provided across public pension systems. 
For all these reasons and others relating to data limitations, only a few stud- 
ies have estimated a multivariate model of social security administration costs. 
The few economic studies that do adopt a simple Cobb-Douglas cost specifi- 
cation, relating social security administration expenses across a set of devel- 
oped and developing nations to output measures (Mitchell, Sunden, and Hsin 
1994; Mitchell, Sunden, Hsin, and Reid  1994; Palacios  1994). In this frame- 
work, both costs and output are measured in natural logs so that the estimated 
coefficient a, in the following equation is interpreted as a measure of  scale 
economies: 
social security costs  = 
social security expenses  = a,  + a, output measures  + 
(2)  + 4  program characteristics 
input prices 
+ a,  technology  + E. 
That is, if  a, proves to be less than unity, it would be concluded that larger 
systems would be less expensive to operate than smaller systems. One problem 
with this prediction is that only rarely do countries report expenses for their 
old age programs separately from their other programs and that overall costs 
would therefore be anticipated to rise when the social security system has many 
different social insurance program obligations. Hence, the empirical models 
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responsible for retirement payments as well as the provision  of  health care, 
unemployment insurance, maternity care, etc. It is likely that cash payments to 
general retirees are less costly to deliver than are means-tested and noncash 
benefits like health care and food stamps. 
Another hypothesis tested with this framework is that social security  sys- 
tems may be more costly to operate when more agencies are involved. Unlike 
in the United States, in some countries the federal, state, municipal, and even 
smaller units of government are involved in the collection of revenue and the 
disbursal of social security benefit payments. Looking across countries, it is 
also important to control the degree to which the population is integrated into 
a national financial system; in practice, this is often done with a proxy variable 
measuring the fraction of the population that is rural dwelling, which probably 
is inversely correlated with computerization, integration into a banking system, 
literacy, and so forth. Finally, it is useful to control differential input prices 
across countries, although in practice obtaining a good measure of this proves 
difficult; one approach is to include a measure of  GDP per capita to capture 
cross-country differences in pay. 
Turning to the empirical findings, Mitchell, Sunden, Hsin, and Reid ( 1994) 
use as a dependent variable social security administration costs expressed as a 
percentage of GDP (to control for exchange rate differences) and regress this 
against social security benefit expenditure (also standardized by GDP).I9 The 
analysis uses cross-sectional data for forty-three countries, including all the 
OECD nations as well as those in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
For this sample, the authors find evidence of substantial scale economies, irre- 
spective of  the other control variables  included in the equation. Across  the 
sample as a whole, a 1 percent increase in output measured by benefit expendi- 
tures is found to be associated with 0.5 percent increase in system administra- 
tion costs. Further refinements indicate that a modification of this overall con- 
clusion  is required.  One is  that  the  OECD nations  have  very  large  social 
security systems and appear to face constant returns to scale; hence, only the 
Latin American and Caribbean nations in this sample face increasing returns 
given the small social security programs they currently support. Second, for 
the subset of nations able to furnish cost data on the national retirement system 
separately from their overall social security program, the evidence is consistent 
with constant returns to scale, rather than increasing returns. These findings 
are robust to the inclusion  of  controls for other program characteristics, and 
none of the other factors is consistently significant in the empirical analysis. 
As far as I know, the only other multivariate study of social security costs is 
that of  Palacios (1994; summarized in James and Palacios  1995). Here, the 
focus is on system administrative costs for forty nations surveyed by the Inter- 
national Labor Organization around the year 1986. Social security system ad- 
19. Benefits and system membership were too collinear to permit including both in the  same 
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ministrative expenses are regressed on the size of the participant pool, a param- 
eter indicating whether the system offers a universal demogrant sort of benefit 
versus an earnings-related benefit, and a special variable to account for un- 
usual  costs  experienced under  Chile’s privately  managed  national  defined- 
contribution system. Of most interest is the finding of  scale economies once 
again: a 1 percent increase in participants raises social security retirement sys- 
tem costs by  only 0.6-0.9  percent. There is also evidence that a universal, 
demogrant system is significantly less costly to administer than a means-tested 
or earnings-related program. Controls measuring the country’s level of technol- 
ogy include energy consumption, which proves to be strongly negatively corre- 
lated with costs, suggesting that more developed countries manage their sys- 
tems less expensively. Finally, the “Chile effect” is positive but only marginally 
significant (at the 10  percent level), suggesting that, given the small size of the 
system, costs are not tembly out of line. 
10.2.3  Further Considerations Regarding Social Security System Costs 
After reviewing social security costs around the world, I find that U.S. sys- 
tem administrative expenses are in the middle of the range for developed na- 
tions, at 3 percent of total expenditures, and are on the order of ten times lower 
than the developing-country average. The U.S. system’s costs per active partici- 
pant appear to be quite low (under $15.00 per worker per year) compared to 
those of many other countries. For example, in Chile, annual per contributor 
costs totaled about $30.00 under the private system and $41  .00 under the pub- 
lic system, and, in Argentina, the public system expenses ran $40.00-$60.00 
annually. 
Nevertheless, there are important, and very difficult to answer, questions 
about whether the funds are well spent and whether output levels and output 
quality are as good as they could be given available funds and technology. 
In many countries, including the United States, for instance, service could be 
improved by cutting the delays experienced in posting earnings to the social 
security records. In many countries’ systems, evasion of social security taxes 
is an important and growing problem, as in Japan and in Chile, where some 
30-50  percent of earnings are believed to be outside the purview of the payroll 
tax (Watanabe 1996; ValdCs-Prieto 1994). Another difficulty is that plan parti- 
cipants are beginning to expect private market rates of return on their contribu- 
tions to the social security system, despite the fact that usually most govern- 
ment old age pensions  are defined-benefit rather  than  defined-contribution 
promises. This expectation has not been met by  public pensions around the 
world producing zero or negative real rates of  return on assets over the last 
decade (World Bank 1994). 
As a result of these issues, serious questions are now being raised about the 
ability of conventional government-run social security programs to produce 
high-quality money management, benefit delivery, and other services in coun- 
tries around the world. Therefore, I turn next to an examination of  costs of 426  Olivia S. Mitchell 
possible alternatives  to a publicly managed social security agency, with the 
intention of comparing potential costs across sectors. 
10.3  Administrative Costs of Alternatives to Social Security 
One reason to assess expenses incurred in running the government-run  so- 
cial security system is that market alternatives might be expected to result in 
lower costs and/or greater services provided. Costs could be high in publicly 
provided plans if, for example, there were diseconomies of scale in production 
or if  private institutions could  select more efficient technologies and inputs 
than  government  bodies. Also, under some scenarios, privately managed  fi- 
nancial institutions might generate outputs more to participants’  liking than 
did the public sector. In this  sense, it is of  interest to ask whether financial 
institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, and/or life insurance compa- 
nies might be able to provide lower-cost (but equivalent or better) service than 
the government-managed  program. 
To address this question, I examine what is known about some of these alter- 
native  financial  institutions  and  offer  some tentative  conclusions  about  the 
findings. The specific institutions analyzed are the mutual fund industry, the 
pension industry, and the life insurance industry. 
10.3.1  Mutual Fund Industry Costs 
The U.S.  mutual fund industry has been in existence for at least five decades: 
recently, mutual funds have become the second largest financial intermediary 
after commercial banks (ICI  1995b). In mid-1996, the industry held over $3 
trillion in assets. 
As U.S. mutual funds have grown in size and influence,  financial market 
analysts have devoted substantial attention to assessing their investment perfor- 
mance, ranking individual funds, and exploring anomalies.*O Analysts agree 
that understanding mutual fund costs requires delving into two general catego- 
ries of  charges, namely, loads and expenses.2’ Loads refers to commissions 
that are levied at the time the investor purchases or sells fund shares or that 
may be exacted when the investor reallocates fund shares across holdings in a 
“fund family.” For example, a fund‘s front-end load is computed by subtracting 
the price at which one may purchase a fund share (the buy price) from the price 
at which one may sell the fund share (the sell price); this figure divided by the 
buy price equals the front-end load. Commonly  seen loads or commissions 
range from 4 to 8.5 percent of invested assets; no-load funds do not charge this 
fee. In back-loaded funds, the term generally refers to a commission associated 
with redeeming a fund investment, which may be a flat rate or a percentage of 
20.  For  example, a compilation of mutual fund returns and expenses appears weekly in the 
Wall Street Journal, and frequent updates are available from Lipper Analytical Services and Mom- 
ingstar Mutual Fund Reports, among others. 
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Table 10.7  Mutual Fund Expense Ratios by Fund Type (funds with assets above 
given levels) 
Qpe  of Fund 
Dollar-Weighted Average Expense 
Ratio (%) 
Average 
Lowest  Highest  Account 
Average  Quartile  Quartile  Size ($) 
Equity index (assets above $100 
million)  ,324  ,150  1.640  20,968 
Money market (assets above $1 
billion)  ,613  ,150  1.000  43,276 
Fixed income (assets above $1 
billion)  ,876  ,280  2.000  34,530 
Growth (assets above $500 million)  1.043  ,500  2.460  16,800 
Growth and income (assets above 
$500 million)  ,834  .390  1.840  22.027 
Balanced (assets above $250 
million)  ,895  ,350  1.910  15,360 
Global (assets above $250 million)  1.250  ,840  1.380  14,686 
Source: Lipper Report, dollar-weighted expense ratios for samples of mutual funds of designated 
size, fiscal years ending  1994-95.  Expense ratio defined as fraction of  assets devoted to fund 
administrative expenses annually. 
assets. A mutual fund employing this type of load may  levy a 5-6  percent 
charge if the funds are withdrawn during the first year of the investment, with 
the rate declining to zero over six or seven years. Additionally, some funds 
charge an exchange or transaction fee when dividends are reinvested and/or 
impose a fee when assets are shifted across different fund types. 
These loads are reported in fund prospectuses  in accordance with regula- 
tions devised by the Securities and Exchange Commission but are typically not 
included in expense ratio information. Instead, expense ratio refers to the frac- 
tion of investor assets expended annually in fees and charges. Included in this 
tally are operating expenses attributable to investment advisory/management 
fees and costs attributable to fund administration. In addition, mutual funds 
must report so-called 12b-1 expenses, or distribution costs that may be charged 
to fund assets. Under SEC rules, such fees and charges must be included in the 
expense ratio  information reported by  mutual funds. However, the fact that 
loads are not incorporated in expense ratio data should be kept in mind when 
comparing expense ratios across funds, particularly in the retail or individually 
purchased mutual fund arena. (No-load funds are more common in the institu- 
tional market.) 
Table 10.7 summarizes categories of  fund expenses from a recent Lipper 
Analytical Services survey of  individually purchased mutual funds. Expense 
ratios for some of  the larger mutual funds in this class appear in table  10.8, 
again for the retail market. Perhaps not surprisingly, table 10.7 indicates that 
the “index fund” group reports the lowest expense ratios of all those repre- Table 10.8  Large Mutual Fund Portfolio Expense Ratios and Other Data 
Expense Ratio  Size of Fund  Turnover Rate 
(% of assets)  ($million)  (%) 
Market Indexa (S&P index)  .45  288  2 
I 
Fidelity funds: 
Blue Chipb (blue chip stock 
fund?  I .02  2,229  182 
capital growth)  .64  1,592  157 




(undervalued S&P)  .96  2,088  22 1 
stock)  I .oo  8,694  235 
Total stock portfolio 
500 Portfolio (S&P index)  .28  9,356"  6' 
Value Portfolio (large-cap 
Balanced Index (60/40 
Total bond portfolio 
(Wilshire 5000 index)  .25*  786h  2' 
index)  .20"  297"  32" 
stocks/bonds)  .2op  4034  16' 
(bonds)  .20'  1,731'  33" 
*Fidelity  Market Index Fund Prospectus, June 1995.  Also an additional $10.00 account fee charged 
per account per year and a 0.50 percent redemption fee charged on shares held less than 180 days. 
Redemption fee not included in returns figure given. 
bAssumes annual account larger than $2,500, else $12.00 annual account maintenance fee charged. 
Total returns do not include one-time sales charge. 
'Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund Prospectus, November 1995. 
dFidelity Fund Prospectus, August 1995. See also note a. 
'Fidelity Disciplined Equity Fund Prospectus, December 1995 See also note a. 
'Fideliry Contrarian Fund Prospectus, February 1995. 
'Vanguard  (1995a). Includes $10.00 annual account maintenance fee charged to account smaller 
than $10,000. 
1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
' 1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
'Vanguard (1995a). Includes $10.00 annual account maintenance fee charged to account smaller 
than $10,000. Also portfolio transaction fee of 0.25 percent per dollar invested assessed in  1995 
(not included in expense ratio). 
" 1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
' 1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
'"Vanguard (1995a). Includes $10.00 annual account maintenance fee charged to account smaller 
than $1O,O00. 
1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
"1994 year end (Vanguard Index Trust Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
'Vanguard  (1995a). Includes $10.00 annual account maintenance fee charged to account smaller 
than $lO,oOO. 
q1994 year end (Vanguard Balanced Index Fund Prospectus, revised April 1995). 
'1994 year end (Vanguard  Balanced Index Fund Prospectus, revised April 1995). 
'Vanguard  (1995a). Includes $10.00 annual account maintenance fee charged to account smaller 
than $1O,O00. 
'1994 year end (Vanguard Bond Index Fund Prospectus, revised September 1995). 
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sented: these funds reported average costs of 0.32 percent of investor assets.22 
This relatively low expense ratio may be compared to several benchmarks, one 
being the next lowest rate in the table, which is for money market funds. This 
latter group reported almost double the index fund level of costs (0.61 percent 
of assets). Another comparison group is the all-fund average of 1.05 percent of 
investor assets reported for 1994 (Vanguard 1995b, 4). These cost differentials 
are striking because of the fact that index funds are relatively new and hence 
relatively  small: index funds on the Lipper list start at asset levels of $100 
million, with an average account size of $21,000, whereas there are numerous 
money market funds on the list with over $1 billion, and average account size 
is double the index fund amount ($43,000 in 1994). 
To the extent that there are scale economies (and Baumol et al. [  19901 have 
reported that there are-costs  rise by only 0.4-0.9  percent as assets grow in 
the mutual fund industry), one might expect the much larger money market 
portfolios to be more cost effective than index funds. However, at least at this 
aggregate level, expense ratios for larger, more actively managed funds are 
higher than those for the smaller, more passively managed set. Expense ratios 
reported for so-called growth and global funds are even higher, at over 1 per- 
cent of assets per year. A possible explanation for these higher expense ratios 
is that the more actively managed funds tend to provide different service levels 
and restrictions over investor behavior, as compared to the passive index funds. 
These include differential access to check-writing privileges, limits on trades 
over given time periods, and other such factors. 
A cost metric  that appears to generate  somewhat different rankings uses 
annual dollar expenses per account, figures appearing in the last column of 
table  10.7. Not surprisingly,  the equity index fund again comes in with the 
lowest costs, at $68.00 per account per year. But now the per account costs of 
money market and fixed-income funds are far higher, between $265 and $300 
annually, a result stemming from their higher expense ratios and larger average 
account size. Even costs for the "balanced"  portfolio totaled around $140 per 
year (these funds seek a mix of equity and fixed income). 
One possible explanation for the relatively low index fund costs is that man- 
agers in this fund group hold broadly diversified portfolios designed to match 
the investment returns of the overall market; on the whole, they devote rela- 
tively little time and effort to stock picking.23 This does not directly explain 
the differences because commissions tend not to be reported in the administra- 
tive cost figures (rather, lower commissions from a more passive management 
style would be capitalized in the mutual fund's  share price). Nevertheless,  it 
22.  Between 1981 and  1994, the expense ratio for the lowest-cost family of mutual funds fell 
48 percent, from 0.58 to 0.30 percent, although for the mutual fund industry as a whole expense 
ratios rose 42 percent, from 0.65 to 0.92 percent of assets (Vanguard 1995b, 3). 
23. Mutual funds as a whole averaged yearly portfolio turnover rates of  76 percent, much higher 
than the 2-6  percent rates for prominent index funds such as Fidelity's  Market Index, Vanguard's 
Total Stock Portfolio, and Vanguard's 500 Portfolio (Vanguard 1996, 2; see also table 10.8). 430  Olivia S. Mitchell 
appears that, as turnover rises, so do fund expenses: thus, a positive (but not 
precisely measured) response of turnover on expenses is also reported by Bau- 
mol et al. (1990, 185). 
This matters because higher expenses would be expected to lower ner rates 
of return on the more actively managed funds, to the extent that markets are 
efficient. Evidence supportive of  an inverse expenseheturns relation was of- 
fered in an analysis of U.S.  retail mutual funds that concluded that better-than- 
average returns earned by high-performing mutual funds were offset by higher 
fund expenses (Ippolito 1989). More extensive trading and investment research 
did appear to generate higher returns, but higher costs were associated with 
generating these returnsz4 
A far lower estimate of mutual fund expenses appears to characterize those 
funds serving the institutional market, targeted to large investment pools such 
as employer pension  plans.  Because of  their considerable  size, these plans 
would be expected to benefit from  some economies of  scale. Nevertheless, 
obtaining clearly comparable estimates of expenses in this market is difficult 
since the larger mutual funds tend to tailor an institutional plan to a particular 
employer’s specification and each custom component can alter expenses in im- 
portant ways. Two examples for which data were gathered include the Institu- 
tional Index Fund at Vanguard, which reported a  1995 expense ratio of  six 
basis points for a minimum $10 million investment (down from seven to eight 
basis points the previous four years), and the same firm’s Employee Benefits 
Index Trust (EBIF), which charges an initial ten basis points in expenses down 
to one basis point for funds over $200 million (a transaction fee is also charged 
of 0.15 percent on net cash flows over $4 million) (Vanguard, Prospectus, 23 
April  1996; Joel  Dickson,  personal  communication, May  1996). After  re- 
viewing similar figures, Dickson concluded that the marginal cost of  money 
management would be even smaller for a large, centrally held mutual fund 
invested primarily in equities: “Total fees charged by an investment adviser for 
managing a broad equity index . . . would be considerably less than  1 basis 
point per year.  If  the money manager  were allowed to earn profits through 
securities lending activities, investment management expenses would be bid 
down to zero. If  securities lending were prohibited,  then  management  fees 
might total  Y4  to  % of  1 basis point per year” (Dickson  1996, 9). To  these 
money-management  costs must be added  annual per capita record-keeping 
fees for individual accounts of around $30.00-$35.00  (Dickson 1996). 
In sum, data on mutual fund administrative expenses suggest several conclu- 
sions: (1) The least costly retail mutual funds report expense ratios of twenty 
to thirty basis points at their current level of operation. They appear to be those 
24. The Ippolito data were reanalyzed by  Elton et al. (1993). who conclude that mutual funds 
did not earn higher-than-average returns. Analysis by  Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) 
suggests that average mutual fund performance lagged behind index fund performance by  seven 
to eighty basis points over  the Ippolito study period (1964-85)  but detects evidence of better 
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offering a portfolio consisting of a broad cross section of the capital market. 
(2) Mutual fund products aimed at the institutional market report significantly 
lower expenses, at under ten basis point annually for money-management fees 
(excluding administrative expenses, thought to be around $30.00-$35.00 per 
year per participant). (3) Until very recently, mutual funds have perceived their 
mission as investment companies rather than full-service retirement plan ad- 
ministrators, so their expenses may fall as they learn the new market.25 
10.3.2  Costs of Managing Pension Plans 
Employer-sponsored pension plans are an institution that some believe of- 
fers a viable and cost-effective alternative to a government social security re- 
tirement program. Like the government system, a pension plan collects contri- 
butions, manages funds, keeps records, and is in charge of disbursing benefits. 
Pension plans also have functions and responsibilities that differ from those 
of a social security system, which in the United States include reporting and 
disclosure requirements to plan participants, the government, and shareholders 
(in publicly held firms) and monitoring and compliance with nondiscrimina- 
tion laws; in the case of a defined-benefit pension, the plan must also pay an- 
nual premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (see Hustead, in 
press). 
Private-Sector Pension Plan Cost Levels 
Establishing pension plan total expenses has been an interest of regulators 
for many decades, although it remains the case that it is much more difficult to 
obtain good data on the investment fees and record-keeping costs of pensions 
than on those of mutual funds. The standards for reporting are less clear, and 
employers sponsoring a single-firm pension plan tend to underreport their pen- 
sion costs since much of  the record-keeping, payroll, and benefits-payment 
work is handled in house and not necessarily billed to the pension plan as an 
expense (Hoexter 1970). 
It is sometimes argued that pension costs are most reliably reported in the 
case of multiemployer pension plans since these plans are run by a joint union/ 
management board that pays expenses centrally. Early evidence supportive of 
this notion was offered by  Hoexter (1984), who found that per member total 
expenses for the multiemployer plans were over six times higher than for single 
employer plans. She also found substantial scale economies among these plans, 
such that costs grew by only 2.5 when membership rose by  100 and costs grew 
by  two-thirds when assets were 20 times larger (Hoexter 1984).  Expense ratios 
stood at 1.6 percent of assets for multiemployer plans with under $2.5 million 
but only 0.4 percent for plans with assets over $50 million. 
25. Within the last year, Fidelity Investments announced that it would be the first mutual fund 
group to provide a full menu of benefit offerings for companies considering benefits outsourcing 
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More recently, the US. Department  of Labor has released  tabulations on 
private-sector pension plans from form 5500 data (U.S. Department of Labor 
1996). Required to be collected by law, the form includes reports on plan ex- 
penses, participants, assets, and liabilities. Here again, it must be kept in mind 
that single-employer pension plan expenses will tend to be underreported, in- 
asmuch as the sponsoring companies absorb some portion of the plan’s admin- 
istrative costs rather than charging them directly to the pension plan. Among 
multiemployer pensions, where the pension plans cover employers of several 
different companies, reported expenses would be expected to be higher partly 
because a fuller accounting of costs is ensured in the multiemployer group. On 
the other hand, multiemployer pension costs may be unduly high inasmuch as 
these plans have recently  faced substantial  legal expenses, incurred  as they 
seek to obtain delinquent contributions from small employers. 
Private-sector pension plan total expenses are summarized in table 10.9 for 
plan year 1992, which reports expenses for pensions with at least one hundred 
participants.2h Single-employer plans in the sample held approximately  $1.6 
trillion in assets, versus $214 million for the multis in 1992. Nevertheless, be- 
cause 63 million participants  were in the single-employer plan pool and  10 
million in the multiemployer pool, net assets per participant were similar, at 
$26,000 and $2  1,000, respectively. Annual contributions were quite different, 
standing at $1,500 in the single-employer plan and around half that, $900 that 
year, in the multiemployer pension system. Defined-benefit pensions for both 
employer types held  more assets than did the defined-contribution  plans, al- 
though contribution  levels in both sectors were higher than for the defined- 
benefit  plans,  attesting to the relatively  mature  status of  the defined-benefit 
plans in both cases (generally, contributions decline as the workforce matures 
and moves into retirement). 
Turning now to expenses, the data reveal that, among defined-benefit pen- 
sions, reported per capita total expenses were between $90.00 and $150 per 
participant per year  (1  992 dollars). By contrast, defined-contribution plan ex- 
penses were much lower, at $3  1  .OO per year for singles and $97.00 per year for 
multis. The fact that they were lower is due in part to lower actuarial costs and 
in part to the fact that defined-contribution plans do not pay premiums to the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for pension insurance. These 
expenses totaled  11 percent of contributions  for single defined-benefit plans 
and  17  percent  of  contributions  for  multiemployer  defined-benefit  plans. 
Defined-contribution plans experienced lower expense rates, but again a sec- 
toral  difference  is evident:  expenses came to 2 percent  of contributions  for 
single-employer defined-contribution plans and  10 percent for the multis. In 
terms of assets, expenses came to 0.65 percent and 0.82 percent, respectively, 
for multiemployer defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. 
The data also show that both types of plans devoted a similar proportion of 
26.  Under ERISA, small plans do not face the same annual reporting requirements. Table 10.9  Private Pension Plan (over 100 participants)  Administrative Expenses (1992) 
Single Employer Plans  Multiemployer Plans 
Defined  Defined  Defined  Defined 
Total  Benefit  Contribution  Total  Benefit  Contribution 
~~  ~ 
Expenses ($million): 
Salaries and allowances 
Accounting fees 
Actuarial fees 
Contract administrator fees 




Other administrative expenses' 
Total Expenses 

























































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1996): assets: table C5, single; table C6, multis; expenses and contributions: table C10, single; table C1  I, multis; partici- 
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the overall total expense to investment advisory and management fees-on  the 
order of 40 percent of the total. Single-employer defined-benefit plans reported 
costs  almost  20  percent  lower  than  multiemployer  plans.  For  defined- 
contribution plans, the single-multiemployer differential was even larger, with 
single-employer plans reporting  costs about one-third those of the multiem- 
ployer  plans.  One reason  that  these costs differed  so is that  multiemployer 
plans spend more on legal fees, for reasons already explained. They also de- 
voted  more  money  to contract  administration  and  salaries,  as compared  to 
single-employer plans. 
More systematic studies of private pension  plan administrative costs have 
been conducted by two research teams that focused on multiemployer pension 
fund expenses (Caswell 1976; Mitchell and Andrews 1981). Using multivariate 
econometric  analysis, both  studies concluded  that  economies  of  scale were 
prevalent in the pension industry. The former was limited to the construction 
industry; the latter examined a broader range of multiemployer plans using a 
cost function of the form 
(3)  expenses = f(participants,  assets, % retired,  % pooled), 
where annual plan expenses were regressed on the number of plan members 
and dollars of plan assets as well as the fraction of members retired and the 
fraction of the assets held in pooled funds. Data from the late 1970s were ob- 
tained from reporting forms filed under the Employee Retirement Income Se- 
curity Act of  1974.*’ The results provided evidence of statistically significant 
scale economies in this set of defined-benefit plans. Specifically, holding con- 
stant the number of plan participants, increasing the plan’s asset size by  1 per- 
cent (holding participants  constant)  was predicted  to increase  costs by  only 
0.27 percent; in other words,  adding to existing pension  plan asset pools is 
relatively inexpensive. Mitchell and Andrews (1981) also showed that, raising 
the number of plan participants  by  1 percent  (holding benefits payable con- 
stant) would raise pension  administrative costs by 0.8 percent, or less than  1 
percent. In other words, increasing the size of the participant pool by adding 
new  members with  comparable assets  would  raise  costs less  than  propor- 
tionally. 
An important reason to ask about variation in pension plan costs, of course, 
is because  such variability in costs might correlate with fund performance. 
A multivariate regression study relating equity management fees to five-year 
annualized pension fund performance  found that lagged strong returns were 
only weakly associated with higher subsequent fees (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1992). Nevertheless, the same study concluded that the equity portion 
of pension  portfolios  underperformed  mutual funds by fifty to one hundred 
basis points between the mid- 1960s and the mid-I980s, suggesting that high 
expenses might reduce fund performance. 
27.  Because the market for pension professionals was assumed to be national in scope, the lack 
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Costs of 401(k) Pension Plans 
Over the last decade in the United States, a new breed of retirement saving 
vehicle has grown up, namely, 401(k) pensions. These plans are often thought 
of as a type of defined-contribution pension but have in fact become increas- 
ingly distinct in character from the old employer-directed defined-contribution 
pension accounts. 
In a 401(k) plan, generally the sponsoring employer will select a set of in- 
vestment vehicles to which participating contributors may direct their contribu- 
tions; individual plan participants often have substantial flexibility over subse- 
quent asset allocations. For example, many funds permit participants to inquire 
about their account balances and alter their accruals as well as new contribu- 
tion flows via a twenty-four-hour telephone service center. In addition, many 
employers allow participants to take loans from their 401(k) plans, a feature 
that increases these plans’ popularity but one that would also be expected to 
raise their operating expenses (Mitchell  1992). In addition, the 401(k) rubric 
encompasses a wide range of plan types and structures, including those funded 
by profit sharing, those with or without employer pretax match amounts, and 
thrift plans. Finally, given the fact that employers are concerned about liability 
for participants’ investment choices, substantial funds are devoted to investor 
education efforts as well as periodic statements of accounts to participants. 
In contrast to the old corporate (and public-sector) pension  model, at the 
time of  retirement participants in a 401(k) plan may select from a variety of 
different payout options (Mitchell 1992). One is to take the accruals in a lump 
sum (and perhaps roll it over into a tax-qualified individual  retirement  ac- 
count); another is to use the funds to purchase an annuity; and a third is to 
accept a graduated payout in accordance with IRS requirements. Because these 
and other feasible payout options are tailored to the individual retiree,  one 
might anticipate that 401(k) administrative costs would exceed those of con- 
ventional defined-contribution plans. 
Evidence on the cost effect of plan flexibility is as yet preliminary. Assets in 
401(k) plans total more than half a billion dollars. The ICI (1995a) data indi- 
cate that 401(k) plans have on the order of  18 million participants, with assets 
per participant running about $26,000 (median $16,000) and median overall 
contribution rates of $2,286 per year (with 35 percent contributed by employ- 
ers). Median record-keeping expenses reported by 401(k) plans in 1993 totaled 
$66.00 per account per year, or 3 percent of annual contributions. Of course, 
to the extent that administrative fees are sometimes charged to the 401(k) plan 
sponsor, reported administrative expenses may appear unduly low (ICI 1995a). 
Nevertheless, one might anticipate that 40  l(k) plans would require somewhat 
more administration than individually purchased mutual funds, inasmuch as 
the tax-qualified plans permit participant  involvement in the asset-allocation 
process and also require monitoring for tax purposes. On average, 20 percent 
of the 401(k) plans permit daily reallocation of accruals or new contributions; 
12 percent  permit  monthly  exchanges;  40 percent permit quarterly adjust- 436  Olivia S. Mitchell 
ments; and  only  20 percent  limit changeovers  to once or twice a year (ICI 
1995a, 10). While permitting more transactions is attractive to many partici- 
pants, industry  experts point out that the practice raises costs. Also, almost 
three-quarters of the plans give out quarterly statements of participants’ asset 
allocation and performance, and most devote substantial effort to marking their 
assets to market, many on an hourly basis. 
Table  10.10 indicates average  total  expenses  charged  by  401(k)  pension 
plans, costs generally  attributable to start-up fees, annual per person service 
charges,  loan  fees, annual reporting  fees, transaction charges, and approxi- 
mately five to ten basis points for trustee charges, presumably mostly insurance 
(ICI 1995). As a matter of practice, money-management fees are not included 
in these tallies and must be added to obtain total expenses. The data indicate 
that average record-keeping expenses range from a low of 80 basis points in 
the short-term bond fund to 188 basis points in international equity funds, with 
the mid-range for equity funds around 140-150 basis points per annum. On an 
annual basis, the average per participant  cost of administering a 401(k) plan 
appears to be between $5.00 and $55.00 annually, including nondiscrimination 
testing, quarterly statements, and investor 
One of the most difficult issues in the 401(k) field is that the 401(k) plans 
often offer a life annuity at retirement, with the result that the product provided 
is distinct conceptually from a simpler money-accumulation plan. Figuring out 
what  additional  expense  the  insurance  annuity  adds,  as  distinct  from the 
money-management  and record-keeping costs, is not a simple matter. Some 
modest evidence in this direction compares expense ratios for small and mid- 
sized 401(k) plans with and without an annuity product embedded in the offer- 
ing (see table 10.11).  (Not reported are record-keeping and administrative fees, 
which are similar for both plan types.) Not surprisingly, it appears that admin- 
istrative expense ratios are higher for 401  (k) plans offering insurance annuit- 
ies: the additional asset-based charge over the mutual fund investment options 
appears to be six to thirty-two basis points.*’ 
Public and International Pension Plan Administrative Cost Comparisons 
It is useful to compare the private pension plan costs reported thus far with 
a range of other plans, as a method of gaining some perspective on the range 
of figures. Comparing expenses of large U.S.  corporate plans with U.S. public- 
sector pension plans and endowmentlfoundation funds shows that fees paid to 
28.  The  range  of  record-keeping  costs  for  401(k)  plans  suggested  by  industry  experts  is 
$15.00-$30.00 per year. 
20.  What is interesting is that, in  the 401(k) plan  containing only an index fund, adding the 
annuity  costs increases costs by  thirty-two basis points, while the  annuity  raises costs by  only 
three to eight basis points  for the  money market, balanced, and equity accounts. This may  he 
explained by  the fact that  few mutual  funds offer an  annuity  product in  the large  institutional 
403(h) marketplace and that reported data may therefore be skewed by an overweighting of smaller 
retail plans. Hence, adding the annuity charge appears to raise expense ratios by a low of 4 percent 
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Table 10.10  Expenses for 401(k) Plans Holding Mutual Funds 
Exp. Ratio  Assets 































Source: "Fund  Scoreboard" (1996). 
Table 10.11  Expense Ratios"  for Small and Midsized 401(k) Pensions with and without 
an Annuity Product (basis points) 
Life Insurance Fund  Mutual Fund 
(401[k] with annuity)  (401  [k], no annuity)  Difference  Ratio 
Type of Fund  (1)  (2)  (1) -  (2)  (1)/(2) 
Equity  1.13 
Balanced  .85 
Fixed income  .84 
Money market  .5 
International  1.53 
Index  .6 
1.07  .06  1.06 
32  .03  1.04 
.66  .18  1.27 
.42  .08  1.19 
1.32  .21  1.16 
.28  .32  2.14 
Source: Driscoll and Springsteel (1995). 
"Asset-based charges (investment expenses) equal fiscal year operating expenses divided by  average net 
assets. Both plans also levy record-keeping and administrative fees on plan sponsors. 
outside managers totaled thirty-four basis points among public funds, as op- 
posed to forty-five among the larger corporate funds in 1994 (Greenwich  Asso- 
ciates 1995a, 1995b, 1995~).  While the government-run plans are somewhat 
less expensive, there is little evidence of  scale economies among this set of 
public plans examined: public funds with over $1 billion in assets paid thirty 
basis points, as opposed to thirty-seven basis points for plans with less than 
$100 million, whereas, in the corporate sector, plans with over $1 billion in 
assets paid thirty-three basis points in expenses, as opposed to those with under 
$100 million in assets, which paid fifty basis points (Greenwich Associates 
1995a, 26). Nevertheless, no formal model was used in that study holding other 
factors constant; more will be said on this below. 
As has been noted, corporate plan sponsors are not required to account for 438  Olivia S. Mitchell 
all pension expenses separately, in contrast with more complete reporting in 
public plans. For instance, in 1994,68 percent of U.S. corporate pension plans 
reported that the plan  sponsor (typically a private employer) directly paid a 
portion of  pension plan staff costs rather than charging the pension plan, but 
only 42 percent of public-sector  plan sponsors devoted staff time to pension 
fund activities (Greenwich Associates  1995a, 35). The smallest publidprivate 
reporting  differential  found  is in  the  area  of  investment-management  fees, 
where 76 percent of the private pension funds and 77 percent of public plans 
reported that their investment-management  fees were charged to the pension 
plan (Greenwich Associates 1995a, 35). Overall, fewer corporate funds charge 
actuarial fees, pension-consulting  fees, and performance-measurement  fees to 
the pension fund, as compared to the public plans. In general, then, the higher 
fees paid by US.  private plans are probably still underreported. 
Other data sets offer distinct comparisons between U.S. corporate funds and 
Canadian and British pension plan costs. Across these three groups, the U.S. 
mean  (median) private  pension  expenditure on annual  money-management 
fees is systematically the highest, at forty (thirty-eight) basis points, compared 
to Canadian corporate funds, which pay thirty (twenty-eight) basis points, and 
U.K. private funds, where the mean is twenty-two (eighteen) basis points. An 
examination of these countries’ corporate pension fund-management  expenses 
reveals that U.S. plans had higher average expenses, as compared to the two 
comparator nations (where funds reported expenses over fifty basis points only 
rarely) (Greenwich Associates 1995a, 26). 
Other places to seek evidence on pension expenses are in the nonprofit as 
well as government pension plans. In the former case, complete expenses are 
reported only to the extent that the plan is charged full cost for expenses in- 
curred in its behalf. A rather interesting case is that of the College Retirement 
Equity Fund (CREF), the nation’s largest defined-contribution  pension plan, 
covering employees in higher education and research institutes. It is a nonprofit 
institution and, for historical reasons, receives special treatment under ERISA 
law. CREF is a national plan, covering people in many different institutions, 
and employers participating  in the system tend to cover most of the payroll- 
based costs as part of their own benefits function. This suggests that the CREF 
plan would appear to have lower costs as compared to a plan where all benefits 
and payroll-related costs were charged to the plan. The system is also quite 
responsive to individual  participating  employers, permitting  cross-employer 
differences  in contribution  levels, rules regarding  lump sum versus annuity 
payouts, and asset-allocation choices; these differences may drive up expenses. 
Additionally, CREF contributions include the value of annuity insurance since, 
strictly speaking, participants  in the contributory  phase purchase  a deferred 
variable annuity. For this reason, costs would not be expected to reflect or to 
be directly relevant to those experienced by corporate pensions. In any event, 
it is of interest to inquire about CREF’s expense structure because of its large 
scale and because some have suggested that this might be a viable model  if 
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CREF costs are reported in table 10.12, where it will be seen that total ex- 
penses (including money management and record keeping) ranged from 0.29 
percent of assets per annum for the money market fund to 0.42 percent for the 
growth fund (plan year ending December 1994). This narrow differential can 
be attributed to CREF’s application of identical administration and distribution 
expenses (0.21 and 0.03 percent of assets, respectively) to all funds. As a re- 
sult, the only source of reported cross-fund variation is due to investment advi- 
sory fees, which vary from 0.05 to 0.18 percent. Certainly, these are low levels 
of  cost, and the differentials narrow in light of the expenses reported for other 
funds described above. It is possible that these lower figures, five to eighteen 
basis  points,  would  characterize  money-management  fees  if  a  large-scale 
funded government program modeled on CREF were to replace the current, 
mostly unfunded, social security system. 
A different pension plan outside the corporate sector is the federal govern- 
ment retirement system, known as the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment 
Fund. This civil service retirement plan is reasonably large, including over 2 
million participants  and $36 billion in assets, and is a contributory defined- 
contribution plan that may be allocated at the participant’s behest into a stock 
fund, a bond fund, and/or a government securities fund. The 1996 annual report 
indicates that  administrative  expense  ratios  in this  system  total  nine  basis 
points; however, this figure excludes costs associated with collections of em- 
ployer and employee contributions since an individual agency’s or office’s pay- 
roll system handles these separately. Even more striking is the low reported 
level of investment expenses-computed  at under one basis point. This figure 
is indicative of the extent of scale economies feasible in a centrally managed, 
large defined-contribution pension plan that restricts its investment choices to 
a very small set of indexes (see table 10.13). 
U.S. state and local pension plans afford another data point on large pension 
plan costs, but here defined-benefit systems are generally the n01-1-n.~~  In a re- 
cent study of  more than three hundred public employee retirement  systems 
with assets of $791 billion and 10.6 million active members in 1992, adminis- 
trative expenditures for these public employee pension plans averaged 9 per- 
cent of total pension contributions; median per participant expenses were $130 
per year (1992 dollars; Hsin and Mitchell 1994). This is comparable to private 
plan costs reported above (yet private plan figures may be biased downward 
for reasons already noted).31 
30.  In  the last few years, however, a handful of states and municipalities have offered a defined- 
contribution  alternative.  For  example,  the  city  of  Westminster,  Colorado, provides  defined- 
contribution plans for its police, firefighters, and general city employees, holding plan assets, $43 
million, for some 770 participants. Expenses per participant are reported at $248 per year  per 
person (1994 dollars). On a percentage basis, annual expenses total 0.45 percent of assets, or 5.4 
percent of contributions. These expenses are allocated roughly two-fifths to operational expenses 
and three-fifths to money management costs. 
3  1. These public plan costs could still be understated, to the extent that public-sector pensions 
probably do not fully account for collection costs, the use of public land and buildings, and benefits 
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Table 10.12  1994 College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF)  Administrative 
Expenses (%) 
Total  Investment  Administrative  Distribution 
Type of Fund  Expenses  Advisory Fees  Expenses  Expenses 
Equity index  .32  .08  .2 1  .03 
Stock account  .34  .10  .21  .03 
Growth  .42  .18  .21  .03 
Global equities  .4  1  .17  .21  .03 
Social choice  .33  .09  .21  .03 
Bond market  .30  .06  .21  .03 
Money market  .29  .05  .2 I  .03 
Source: CREF (1995)-data  cover year ending December 1994 
The econometric analysis recognized that public-sector pensions might not 
operate on the economically efficient feasible frontier with minimum possible 
expenditures, inasmuch as public retirement systems usually are not subject to 
market pressures. Hence, a frontier cost model was estimated using a general 
multiproduct cost function of the form 
(4)  administrative costs, = f(output vector, input prices; a)  + E,, 
where a  is a vector of parameters,  and  E, is an error term made up of two 
independent components (E~  = vz  + u,, where v!  captures random error, and u, 
2 0). Of particular relevance to the present work is the finding of substantial 
scale economies: among public-sector pension plans, a  1 percent increase in 
the number of plan participants raised pension administrative expenditures by 
0.74 percent, holding assets per participant constant, and a 1 percent increase 
in assets ceteris paribus raised costs by less than half a percent. A more trou- 
bling finding was that some 30 percent of reported administrative expenditures 
was attributed to inefficiencies, although this figure was lower than those re- 
ported by other public-sector agencies. 
Having measured pension plan inefficiency gaps, the analysis then explores 
factors associated with  measured inefficiencies.  The evidence  suggests that 
public plans were more efficient when investment services were contracted out 
to private money managers. It was also found that granting pension boards 
authority over their administrative budgets reduced  administrative efficiency, 
particularly when  administrative budgets were picked up by  the  sponsoring 
employer (as opposed to having the pension fund cover its own costs). In gen- 
eral, therefore, administrative costs of public pension plans could probably be 
reduced somewhat, perhaps by  as much as a third, with  somewhat different 
reporting and management structures.’* 
32. In related work, Mitchell and Hsin (1994) and Mitchell and Smith (1994) found that public 
plan funding and investment performance was related to the composition and responsibilities of 
the pension boards managing the plans. Specifically, funding and returns were lower when a pen- 
sion plan had more participants on the board, when in-state investments were required, and when 
board members were not required to carry liability insurance. (See also Hsin and Mitchcll 1997.) Table 10.13  Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board Financial Data (1995 dollars) 
Summary Data, Federal Thrift 
Plan (year end 1995)  Data by Fund Type 
Average account size ($) 







As % of net assets 
As % of total contributions 
Investment expenses ($billion) 
As  % of net assets 
As % of total contributions 
Administrative expenses ($billion) 
16,500  U.S. Government Securities Investment Fund: 
2.2  Assets ($billion)  12.8 
Administrative expenses ($billion)  .024 
26.5  Administrative expenses/assets (a)  .I9 
36.3  Wells Fargo Equity Index Fund: 
5.6  Assets ($billion)  11.5 
3.8  Administrative expenses ($billion)  ,008 
1.8  Administrative expensedassets (%) 
33.4  Wells Fargo U.S. Debt Index Fund: 
.09  Assets ($billion) 
.59  Administrative expenses ($billion) 







Source: Arthur Andersen LLP (1996). 
Nore; Expenses associated with collection of  payroll contributions not included in expense figures. Fiduciary insurance premiums set at zero in  1995. Invest- 
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Trends in Pension Administrative Costs over Time 
Estimates of trends in pension plan administration costs over time are rela- 
tively few, but one source is a recently revised and updated report on defined- 
benefit  and  defined-contribution  pension  plans  over  the  period  198  1-96 
(Hustead, in press). Table 10.14 summarizes annual defined-benefit costs on a 
per person basis (in  1996 dollars) as computed from an actuarial simulation 
for a hypothetical plan and real cost trends over time. 
The results  indicate that average per participant costs rose rapidly for all 
sizes of plans and for both plan types, particularly during the latter half of the 
1980s. Whereas annual private plan expenses stood at about $23.00-$26.00 
per participant in larger pensions in 198  1 (1996 dollars), by the mid- 1990s the 
cost has risen almost three times for the defined-benefit pension plan and by 
almost double for the defined-contribution plan. Similar percentage changes 
characterized  small pension plans, although the levels of  administrative ex- 
penses for both plans are much higher because the smaller plans could less 
ably capture scale economies. In 1981, small plans of both types experienced 
per participant costs of  under $200 per year per participant in  1981, but, by 
1996, defined-contribution costs were $287 and defined-benefit costs higher 
than $600 per participant per year. Large plans reported administrative costs 
of $68.00 (defined benefit) and $49.00 (defined contribution) per year in 1996. 
(It should be noted that these administrative expenses exclude investment man- 
agement fees but that they do include Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporate 
premiums for the defined-benefit pension plan figures.) 
Several explanations have been offered for the increasing cost levels as well 
as  the  rising  differential  between  defined-benefit  and  defined-contribution 
plans; most prominent explanations are the increasingly complex nondiscrimi- 
nation rules that plan  sponsors must meet  and the rising  cost of  insurance 
premiums  for  defined-benefit pension  plans  (Hustead, in  press;  Clark  and 
McDermed 1990). 
Table 10.14  Actuarial Analysis of Defined-Benefit Pension Administrative Costs 
per Person (1994 dollars) 
Size of Pension Plan 
IS Participants in Plan  10.000 Participants in Plan 
Year  DB ($)  DC ($)  DC/DB (8)  DB ($)  DC ($)  DCiDB (8) 
1981  184  131  71  22  24  110 
1985  456  374  82  31  32  I04 
1991  518  259  14  62  46  74 
Source: Author’s calculations from Hay/Huggins (1990), 31, 39. 
Note: DB = defined benefit. DC = defined contribution. 443  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
Overview 
This investigation into pension plans of different types and in different sec- 
tors suggests several conclusions regarding pension administrative cost levels, 
differentials, and trends: (1) Large corporate pension plans reported total ad- 
ministrative costs of $68.00 (defined benefit) and $49.00 (defined contribution) 
per year  in  1996. These costs have  risen  steadily  in  real  terms  over  time. 
(2) Scale economies are significant  for pension plans. Total  administrative 
costs are much higher-perhaps  five to ten times as high-on  an annual per 
person basis, in company pension plans with fifteen versus ten thousand parti- 
cipants. (3)  Overall pension  plan expenses appear to be split approximately 
two-fifths to advisory and money-management fees and three-fifths to contract 
administration  and salaries. Paying benefits in the form of  an annuity  adds 
additional costs, roughly six to thirty-two basis points over a mutual fund in- 
vestment. (4) U.S. corporate pension plans report substantially higher money- 
management fees than do their Canadian and U.K. counterparts, at about forty 
basis points instead of twenty to thirty basis points. Corporate U.S. pension 
plans also report higher outside management fees than do public U.S. pension 
funds (where the latter devote about thirty-three basis points to outside fees). 
(5) Public- and nonprofit-sector pension plan expenses tend to be lower than 
corporate plan  costs.  For example, the CREF plan  covering  employees  in 
higher education and research institutes reports devoting twenty-nine to forty- 
two basis points to expenses, with a constant fraction devoted to record keep- 
ing and distribution (twenty-four basis points) across plans. The Federal Thrift 
Retirement plan devotes nine basis points to administrative costs and less than 
one basis point to money-management costs. These figures should not  be di- 
rectly extrapolated to the private-sector arena, however. 
10.3.3  Administrative Expenses in the Insurance Industry 
Another line of inquiry pertains to the question of how well insurance firms 
could supply retirement annuities in the event that social security benefits were 
scaled down substantially. In this regard, it is important to address two issues: 
First, how efficient are privately managed insurance firms? Second, how well 
does the insurance market work as a whole? Presumably, the appeal of social 
security privatization would increase if private firms could be anticipated to fill 
the gap and to do so at relatively low cost. 
In terms of the life insurance business in the United States, the American 
Council on Life Insurance (1995, 37) reports that life insurance firms in 1994 
received some $453 billion in annual premiums and investment earnings. On a 
per dollar of  asset basis, expenses totaled  11 percent  of  annual income (16 
percent of  annual contributions) and amounted to some 2.6 percent of the asset 
base of almost $2 trillion in 1994. Some 45 percent of the total expense dollar 
is devoted to selling costs or agents’ commissions. 
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in the property-casualty market (e.g., Cummins and Weiss  1995). As a rule, 
these studies estimate cost functions, and the availability of firm-level panel 
data has permitted the estimation of quite flexible functional specifications. A 
persistent problem acknowledged across all these studies is that it is difficult 
to measure insurance firm output and quality. Hence, persistent cost differen- 
tials over time between different lines of insurance and different distribution 
systems for the same insurance product turn out to be quite difficult to interpret 
(see Berger, Cummins, and Weiss 1995). Nonetheless, looking across the avail- 
able literature, it appears that firms in the US. property-casualty  insurance 
sector are operating  inside their efficient  production  frontier by  significant 
margins, suggesting room for reductions in system administrative expenses.33 
In addition to the general efficiency question just raised is a serious concern 
regarding how  seriously  adverse selection  and moral hazard pose important 
real-world obstacles to the privatization of retirement annuities. Allowing indi- 
viduals to elect whether to take their retirement accounts as a lump sum or as 
an annuity suggests that there are some potentially troubling weaknesses in the 
market for annuities. One influential  study concluded that  expected  annual 
yields on individual life insurance policies were approximately 2 percentage 
points lower than on group policies owing to adverse selection (Warshawsky 
1988). Other evidence suggests that purchasing individual annuities costs ap- 
proximately two-thirds more than group purchase (Diamond and Valdks-Prieto 
1993). These findings, along with the high and not necessarily efficient annual 
costs reported above, suggest that privatization of the insurance portion of the 
system would raise costs beyond current public provision  of  the old age an- 
nuity. 
10.4  Relating These Findings to a Privately Managed Old Age 
Retirement System 
How these findings might be relevant to a privatized social security system 
in the United States depends on the exact institutional structure that would be 
implied under such a reform. One option, dubbed the maintain benefits option 
by  members of the  Social Security Advisory Council, is to simply invest a 
portion  of  the existing social security  trust  fund in equities. This approach 
would leave intact the current revenue-collection mechanism, the Social Secu- 
rity Administration’s record-keeping and benefit-payout functions, and all else; 
the only change would be that the government would now invest a portion of 
the fund, probably in an index portfolio (Quinn and Mitchell 1996). 
Whether or not purists would deem this a real step toward privatization, it is 
nevertheless  seen by  many as a viable political  possibility. Supporters argue 
that the SSA could earn higher rates of return than on Treasury bills; detractors 
33.  For studies of life insurance industry costs and efficiency, see Grace and Timme (1992), 
Fields and Mulphy (1989). Gardner and Grace (1993), Yuengert (1993),  and Zi (1994). 445  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
point to  the fact that system participants  may  be forced  to confront greater 
capital market risk than under the current defined-benefit plan (Mitchell and 
Zeldes 1996). In any event, it is plausible to argue that system expenses would 
increase as the government took on an additional  money-management func- 
tion, but the additional costs would probably be relatively small. If the trust 
fund were simply deposited  in an indexed, passively managed mutual fund, 
administrative expenses would  rise by as little as one to as many as twenty 
basis points, with the likeliest number being at the lower end of the range. 
This figure relies on cost figures currently experienced by large, passively 
managed mutual funds; it could rise if more actively managed portfolios were 
chosen. Some analysts have expressed concern that political pressures would 
be brought to bear on a government-managed pension account worth, eventu- 
ally, several hundred  billion  dollars.34 To the  extent that  this did occur, ex- 
penses  would  be higher and investment performance lower than the returns 
offered by  competitive  privately  managed  mutual  funds (Mitchell and Hsin 
1994).  This estimate also assumes that the government would continue to col- 
lect revenues, maintain records, and disburse benefits as now; in other words, 
the investment fee would be the only incremental charge over the system’s cur- 
rent expenses. 
A different approach to social security privatization is the proposal to estab- 
lish a “personal saving account” (PSA).” This plan would require all partici- 
pants to deposit a portion of their payroll taxes into individual private pension 
accounts managed by  regulated but private fund administrators.36  These pen- 
sion managers  would  then invest participants’ assets and pay out benefits  at 
retirement. An important question regarding how such accounts might work in 
the United States has to do with how much self-directed investment would be 
permitted in the PSAs and how interfund competition would be regulated since 
the  system’s inception.  In  Chile,  for instance,  private  pension  fund  asset- 
allocation decisions have been heavily restricted. There, workers may change 
pension allocations only three to four times per year (and must hold all their 
funds in a single pension  fund at any given time), and fund managers  face 
extensive regulation regarding asset composition, permissible (and prohibited) 
commission charges, and reserves. Although early in that nation’s privatization 
drive administrative costs were quite high (about 23 percent of contributions 
or 14 percent of assets), these costs have dropped more recently (to 15 and 2.3 
percent,  respectively). It is, of course, inevitable that costs would be higher 
initially; the subsequent downward cost trend results partly from competition 
34.  Testimony of Sylvester Schieber before the Senate Finance Committee, 25 March 1996. 
35.  For further discussion of the Chilean system, see Diamond and Valdts-Prieto (1993) and 
World Bank (1994). 
36.  There is debate over whether this plan would  be  mandatory or optional and how funds 
would be collected. If contributions were collected at the individual level instead of  continuing to 
use the Internal Revenue Service, collection costs could also be expected  to rise substantially. 
Many of the issues raised in this discussion are taken up in Technical Panel on Trends and Issues 
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and partly from scale economies as assets have grown. Still, however, after 
fifteen years, the Chilean AFP pension system is relatively small by U.S.  stan- 
dards,  having  assets of  around  U.S.$25  billion  (Edwards,  chap.  1 in  this 
volume). 
If a PSA system were mandated in the United States, system administrative 
expenses would clearly rise, but probably not as much as the high end of the 
costs experienced in Chile. Inevitably, specific cost rates would depend on spe- 
cific plan design details, such as what investors are permitted to do with their 
funds, how often they can reallocate their investment portfolio, and what re- 
strictions on fees and other rules are instituted. An optimistic assessment would 
take the Federal Thrift Plan numbers, where it will be recalled that only three 
relatively passively managed options are permitted. In that system, administra- 
tive expense ratios were nine basis  points (excluding collection  costs), and 
money-management expenses are estimated at less than one basis point. Obvi- 
ously, fund charges could be higher if people opted for more actively managed 
accounts; recent research on 401(k) plans has concluded that the first cohort to 
have access to these plans chose fixed-income and guaranteed insurance com- 
pany holdings, but younger participants have chosen equity funds by substan- 
tial margins (see table 10.15). The CREF plan offers many additional options 
and has estimated expense figures of thirty to forty basis points annually (in- 
cluding record keeping). 
A PSA account system that required investors to place their contributions 
with  mutual  funds  would  probably  experience  higher  administrative  and 
record-keeping fees and would also probably incur costs associated with pro- 
viding  annuities. In terms of the former expense, if  individual pension  ac- 
counts were offered as add-ons to existing company-sponsored 40 1  (k) plans, 
administrative costs would probably be on the order of $50.00-$60.00 per year. 
This assumes that the plan does not require (or offer) that benefits be paid out 
in an annuity. If  one were additionally to require that benefits be paid as an 
annuity, costs would probably  rise by  an extra  10 percent of  contributions, 
or $100 per participant per year, extrapolating from multiemployer defined- 
Table 10.15  Defined-Contribution Asset Holdings by Participant Age (%) 
Age of Plan Participant 
Proportion of Assets Held In:  21-30  3 1-40  41-50  5  1-60  61 + 
Fixed-income funds  41  43  49  62  85 
Domestic equity funds  39  36  30  22  10 
Balanced funds  6  8  11  8  I 
Company stock funds  11  9  6  6  3 
International equity funds  3  3  4  3  1 
Source: Derived from Schieber and Goodfellow (forthcoming, table 4). 
Note: Columns may not sum to 100 percent owing to rounding error. 447  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
contribution plan costs. This figure might be lower if, as the annuity market 
grew, private insurance firms experienced substantial scale economies; it might 
be higher if substantially greater adverse selection resulted from optional annu- 
ity purchases. 
10.5  Conclusion 
Opponents of social security privatization argue that privately managed sys- 
tems are more costly to manage than public systems, and this is a charge that 
advocates must evaluate carefully. This paper contributes to the discussion by 
exploring a range of evidence on public and private pension system administra- 
tive expenses as well as the determinants of  retirement system administrative 
efficiency in the United States and elsewhere. 
The research shows that the administrative costs of providing old age retire- 
ment benefit  services through a public  system are often difficult  to measure 
with precision. Conceptually, a comparison of public administration costs with 
private plan costs requires not only assessing the expenses incurred in deliv- 
ering pension services but also controlling for the quality of services delivered. 
Available data fall far short of the desired measures. Nevertheless, evidence 
from international  sources indicates that there are wide differences in retire- 
ment system administration costs from plan to plan and from country to coun- 
try. Some of these differences are due to the level of  privatization, but most 
appear to be attributable to particular institutional structures and management 
practices. 
For example, the U.S. Social Security Administration manages a very large 
old age system at costs that are mid-range among developed nations, but these 
costs are low compared to smaller systems in smaller countries. Using several 
different metrics, these costs may be alternatively described as 0.7 percent of 
benefit expenditures, 0.4 percent of contributions, $12.00-$14.00 per covered 
worker per year  ($9.00 per participant  in  1994), or 0.39 percent  of  system 
assets (the latter figure is, however, misleading because the system is mostly 
unfunded). In exchange for these costs, the US.  social security system appears 
to do some things quite well. Focusing  on the provision of  benefits, for in- 
stance, there is reason to believe that most eligible retirees receive the benefit 
amounts to which they are entitled on time. On the other hand, the posting of 
workers’ earnings to system computer files could be improved, although this 
delay causes no particular problem under current rules. Under current rules, the 
U.S. social security system bears relatively small expenses for the collection of 
revenues and virtually nothing for money management since funds must by 
law be invested in special issue Treasury bills. 
These figures were compared with expenses reported by  a range of other 
financial institutions that might be potential players in a privatized social secu- 
rity system. Data from both retail and institutional mutual funds, private and 
nonprofit  pension  plans,  and  insurance  companies were  collected.  Each of 448  Olivia S. Mitchell 
these private alternatives produces a somewhat different mix of outputs, with 
varying types of participant tailoring and service. The data suggest that adding 
a privately  managed  individual savings  account to existing mutual fund or 
401(k) plans would be relatively low cost, with money-management fees po- 
tentially ranging between one and twenty basis points (for a passively managed 
indexed portfolio) and administrative costs of perhaps $50.00  per year. Money- 
management costs could be  substantially higher for more actively managed 
funds. 
If  a group model were taken as the likely prototype of a privatized system, 
such as a national TIAA-CREF-type or Federal Thrift-type  plan (and the range 
of  options were limited quite substantially), investment costs have been esti- 
mated to be on the order of a basis point or less per year. Administration costs 
would be potentially on the order of twenty to thirty basis points, judging from 
available evidence. In addition, one must add the costs of providing longevity 
insurance if annuities are to be g~aranteed.~’ 
Even if  a privately  managed  defined-contribution system would  result in 
somewhat higher administrative costs compared to the current pay-as-you-go 
system, these higher expenses would have consequences that many would find 
appealing. These additional expenses make possible a system that handles the 
pension  system’s necessary  functions  with greater alacrity  while permitting 
workers to undertake more active asset management in their retirement portfo- 
lios. A variant of  this approach has been  suggested by  several members of 
the  1994-96  U.S. Social Security Advisory Council: under this scenario, the 
government would offer and manage three to four funds among which plan 
participants could choose. This approach would also result in higher adminis- 
trative costs as compared to the current social security system, but it would 
still permit some of the advantages of having individual accounts. 
All the privatization  options  considered  here would  be  expected  to cost 
somewhat more in administrative expenses than the current publicly run plan 
in the United States, but the precise level of administrative costs in a privatized 
social security system will depend crucially on the specifics of the plan pro- 
posed. Costs will rise, experts believe, if actively managed funds are permitted, 
if twenty-four-hour call-up access were allowed, and if participants can obtain 
loans from the funds. Some of the variants would also entail higher collection 
costs, reporting expenses, and insurance annuity costs. A lower-cost  system 
would require only a few investment options with little hands-on  participant 
access and infrequent reporting. Offsetting these additional costs, of  course, 
are potentially  substantial economic benefits flowing from having a privately 
managed system (Feldstein and Samwick, chap. 6 in this volume; Kotlikoff, 
chap. 7 in this volume; Quinn and Mitchell 1996; Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). 
37. This is one aspect of the current social security retirement account that might continue to 
be managed by the government, although encouraging the formation of  groups for insurance pur- 
poses may suffice. 449  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
These benefits could include the opportunity for participants’ contributions to 
earn a higher rate of  return than that feasible under the public program, the 
possibility that labor supply and savings disincentives would be diminished, 
and a reduction in the political risk regarding future benefits. 
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Comment  Sylvester J. Schieber 
In her paper,  Olivia Mitchell presents an extensive analysis of  the costs of 
administering a wide range of retirement programs. She investigates the costs 
of  administering  programs  operated  under  several different  structures.  She 
looks  at  public  and  private  plans  as well  as  defined-benefit  and  defined- 
contribution plans. Finally, she evaluates U.S. plan administration costs and 
those of national retirement plans around the world. 
I draw conclusions from Mitchell’s paper and from the discussions in and 
about other papers presented at the conference and apply them in sketching 
out possible administrative structures for a US. personal investment option of 
the sort considered by the Social Security Advisory Council in their delibera- 
tions during 1995 and  1996. I also look at some of  the existing models and 
explore their relevance  as appropriate administrative structures for personal 
investment accounts. 
One of the major conclusions that comes from this paper and other discus- 
sions at the conference is that there are tremendous opportunities to realize 
economies of scale in administering retirement plans. We see that the relative 
costs of administering the U.S. social security system have fallen over the years 
as coverage and benefits have expanded. Sebastian Edwards showed us (chap. 
1 in this volume) that the costs of administering Chile’s plan, as a percentage 
of assets in the personal accounts, has fallen significantly over the life of the 
plan now operating there. Mitchell shows us the same kinds of economies of 
scale in the administration of  private and public employer-based  retirement 
systems in this country. 
In order to put into context the potential size of the system that might arise 
if  the United States were to allow personal accounts of the sort included in 
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the personal saving account (PSA) proposal considered by the Social Security 
Advisory Council, we can compare the potential here in the United States with 
the situation in Chile. For example, Edwards has told us that Chile’s system 
has accumulated $25 billion over one and a half decades of operation. By com- 
parison, if the PSA proposal were implemented on 1 January  1998, the PSA 
accounts would hold roughly $25 billion by the middle of March of that year. 
In today’s dollars, these accounts would surpass $0.5 trillion within five years, 
$1 trillion within nine years, and $2 trillion within seventeen years. Once again, 
by way of comparison, James Poterba and David Wise (chap. 9 in this volume) 
tell us that 401(k) assets equal $600-$700 billion today. Under the PSA pro- 
posal,  employees’  annual contributions  to  their  individual  accounts would 
equal two to three times current contributions to 401(k) plans. In other words, 
the PSAs would become a very large collection of  personal retirement assets 
in a relatively short time. If nothing else, the size of the accumulations would 
make it important that we be efficient in the administration of the program. 
In developing an administrative structure to support a program like that en- 
visaged in the PSA proposal, we would have certain advantages over many of 
the countries that have set up mandated  individual retirement programs.  For 
example, when Chile began its program, it had no  long-term bond markets. 
Indeed, it found it necessary to create a whole new  system of funds for the 
investment of the personal accounts that developed under the new system. In 
our case, we already have a highly developed marketplace of  asset types and 
funds available for the investment of the funds that would result from the adop- 
tion of a personal account proposal. And, as Mitchell has documented, many 
of these are operating at levels of administrative costs, at least on the asset- 
accumulation side of the system, well within the range of assumed costs of one 
hundred basis points per year used in developing the PSA proposal now before 
the Social Security Advisory Council. 
In her paper, Mitchell points to some existing systems as potential adminis- 
trative models for the personal account system that we might adopt here in the 
United  States,  namely,  TIAAKREF and  the  Federal  Retirement  System 
(FERS). The thing that is attractive about both these systems is that they oper- 
ate with extremely low administrative costs. While low costs are important, the 
costs of services should not be the only consideration  in setting up whatever 
administrative structure we might adopt if we move forward with a PSA-type 
proposal. In recent years, dissatisfaction with the range of investment options, 
with  flexibility  to move  assets,  and with  the  level  of  services provided  by 
TIANCREF has led a number of participating institutions in that program to 
offer an alternative set of investment and annuity options. The FERS system 
has been held out as a potential  model  for management of  the individually 
accumulated funds in some U.S. reform proposals.  FERS has an extremely 
limited set of investment options that many participants do not find sufficient 
to meet their needs and is currently considering a more typical set of offerings 
provided by employer sponsors of these types of plans. 454  Olivia S. Mitchell 
While TIANCREF or FERS might not be the exact models that we would 
want to adopt under a personal account system, I believe that we should struc- 
ture a system that would allow most workers to invest through group arrange- 
ments. In the consulting that Watson Wyatt does with employers on the admin- 
istration of  their 401(k) plans, we find that workers often prefer to use their 
employer plans as a means to consolidate their retirement savings into a coordi- 
nated set of investment options. I believe that the licensing of  many existing 
investment offerings would allow employers to offer sets of widely available 
existing investment options to their employees in coordination with 401  (k) of- 
ferings already being offered by those same employers. I believe that licensing 
is important because many employers will be reluctant to take on the fiduciary 
obligations of selecting and validating such plans on their own. 
In discussing potential administrative costs with some of the organizations 
that would administer PSAs if  we were to adopt such a program here in the 
United States, I have been told by several of them that, if the government were 
to impose annual administrative cost limitations of  fifty or seventy-five basis 
points, we would still see many firms offering their funds for PSA investments. 
Even without  those limits, we might expect PSA administration costs to be 
less than current 401(k) costs for several reasons. As noted earlier, PSA contri- 
butions under the option considered by the Social Security Advisory Council 
would be about two to three times the level of contributions to 401(k) plans. 
Another would be because the PSAs would not be required to do the same kind 
of discrimination modeling and testing that are required of 401(k) plans. Fi- 
nally, costs would likely be lower because of  the revolution  going on in  the 
administration of these types of plans. The ability to move money between 
funds, to get balances in accounts, etc. without the intervention  of a human 
being on the administration end of plans is expanding rapidly. These techno- 
logical advances will significantly reduce the cost of individual account plans 
in the future. 
On the annuity front, there is still much work to be done. The proponents of 
the PSA proposal at the Social Security Advisory Council did not develop this 
facet of the proposal as fully as others. The whole issue of requiring annuitiza- 
tion is one that was discussed and garners a wide range of opinions. The think- 
ing in not requiring annuitization of the personal accounts in the PSA proposal 
flowed from the analysis of benefit levels provided through the floor of protec- 
tion in the flat benefit. Specifically, the analysis indicated that, for the prototyp- 
ical “low-wage workers,” the flat benefit alone would provide a level of  real 
benefits roughly comparable to the level of benefits provided under current law. 
For the “average”- and “maximum”-wage workers, the flat benefit would dip 
below the poverty line by up to $100 per month for a ten- to fifteen-year period 
but would exceed current poverty levels beyond that. The question faced in 
developing the PSA proposal was at what level it was appropriate to set a re- 
quired annuity floor of protection. Some people would clearly set it higher than 
the PSA proponents did. 455  Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems 
Mitchell’s paper pulls together a great deal of information on retirement plan 
administration  costs.  It  makes  an  important  contribution  to the  discussion 
about personal retirement account policy options. The issue of reasonable ad- 
ministrative cost assumptions was one of the most acrimonious elements of the 
Social Security Advisory Council’s deliberations over PSAs. While this paper 
does not tell us definitively what these costs might be, it helps us understand 
some of the reasonable boundaries that we face. 
Discussion SUmmXy  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion began with a participant noting a trade-off that exists in other 
countries’ public retirement  schemes. A means-tested first tier of  benefits is 
very expensive to administer but relatively cheap to fund. In contrast, a high 
flat-rate benefit for the first tier is cheap to administer but expensive to fund. 
Since no one is actively proposing either one of these plans for the United 
States, the author also pointed out a similar trade-off that exists in disability 
insurance programs: the government can spend more on screening and less on 
benefits to those who are marginally eligible for the program, or it can spend 
very little on screening and wind up paying out greater sums to beneficiaries. 
Both examples  served to highlight the possible interactions between the ad- 
ministrative and the funding costs of retirement schemes. 
Questions then began to focus on the cost data that were reported in the 
paper. A suggestion was made that it would be useful to have information not 
just on average total costs but on the breakdown of the whole cost function 
into, for example, fixed and variable costs. Two other ways of presenting the 
cost data were also suggested: the marginal cost of  another dollar of  assets 
under management  and the marginal  cost of  another person  in the fund. A 
question was raised as to whether the author was double-counting costs in mu- 
tual funds or 401(k) plans  because  many  of those  funds waive the record- 
keeping fees. It was also noted that the figures presented are charges, rather 
than costs. 
The participants commended  the author’s emphasis on the distribution of 
costs.  Quoting  the  ranges  of  costs  is  important  because  the  money- 
management and insurance industries are composed of imperfectly competi- 
tive markets. It was then noted that the Social Security Advisory Council had 
assigned costs of five, ten, and one hundred basis points to the MB (mainte- 
nance of benefits),  IA (individual account), and PSA (personal security ac- 
count) plans, respectively. These figures are all within the ranges presented in 
the paper for analogous schemes, but it was also pointed out that privatized 
plans like the PSA plan that do not completely eliminate the current system 
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The last point of discussion was that an additional cost of a privatized system 
would be that of regulating the management of the funds. One proposal that 
has been associated with the IA plan is to allow the federal government to set 
up its own fund that would follow a passive investment strategy and therefore 
have low administrative costs. Many participants  expressed concern that, al- 
though this default option could put competitive pressure on private funds to 
keep their charges low, there was a grave risk of the government fund abusing 
its soft budget constraint. 